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Inversions, Related Party Expenditures, and Source 
Taxation: Changing the Paradigm for the Taxation of 
Foreign and Foreign-Owned Businesses 
Julie A. Roin∗ 
The disconnect between the rules for the taxation of domestic businesses 
and foreign and foreign-owned businesses operating in the United States 
both diminishes the federal treasury and distorts taxpayer and business 
behavior. Yet bringing the sets of rules into closer coordination is no simple 
task. This Article examines many of the solutions proffered in the academic 
literature and details the difficulties and trade-offs that each entails. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much to the dismay of President Obama,1 some members of 
Congress,2 and Treasury,3 2015 was another banner year for inversion 
transactions.4 Indeed, sixty-six percent of the outbound deals 
involving U.S. companies proposed in 2015 were inversions.5 Even 
Treasury’s issuance of an inversion-unfriendly notice in November of 
2015 failed to slow the pace of these transactions; shortly thereafter, 
Pfizer, a U.S. drug company, and Allergan, an Irish drug company, 
announced plans for a record-breaking, $160 million merger.6 There 
 
 1. President Obama lambasted inversion transactions as “unpatriotic” in a speech given 
in July 2014. See Dunstan Prial, Obama Takes Aim at ‘Unpatriotic’ Corporate Inversions, FOX 
BUS.: POL. (July 24, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy-policy/2014/
07/24/obama-takes-aim-at-unpatriotic-corporate -inversions/. 
 2. Several anti-inversion bills have been introduced over the last several years, but “[t]he 
congressional Republican majority has been unwilling to clamp down further without an 
agreement for broader tax reform.” Richard Summerfield, The continuing appeal of inversions, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2015), http://www.financierworldwide.com/the-continuing-
appeal-of-inversions/#.VpF21fkrJpg. 
 3. The term “Treasury,” as used in this Article, refers to the United States Department 
of the Treasury.  Treasury issued two notices, Notice 2014-52 on September 22, 2014, and 
Notice 2015-79 on November 19, 2015, aimed at making inversion transactionS less attractive 
by increasing their costs and decreasing their benefits. See Timothy R. Larson, 2016: Another 
Year of the Inversion: Playing Whack-a-Mole with Corporate Taxes until Congress Acts, METRO. 
CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2016, at 8 (describing contents of Treasury notices). 
 4. An inversion transaction is a transaction in which a U.S. corporation redomiciles for 
tax purposes in a foreign country, typically a lower-tax or even-tax haven country. Such 
transactions typically involve mergers with larger foreign corporations. See Larson, supra note 3, 
at 8 (“Simply put, inversion is the process whereby a U.S. multinational group essentially 
redomiciles outside the United States.”); Summerfield, supra note 2 (“A tax inversion allows 
firms—typically US companies—to agree and complete an M&A transaction which sees the firm 
acquire an overseas target in a jurisdiction with a lower corporate tax rate. Once the deal has 
completed, the acquiring company merges with the target and then redomiciles in the target 
company’s homeland, or a third country with a lower level of corporate tax.”). Inversions 
provide a mechanism for redomiciling existing U.S. corporations; those setting up new 
businesses in corporate form may avoid the anti-inversion rules by setting up their business 
initially as a foreign corporation. 
 5. See Summerfield, supra note 2 (“In 2015 to date, 66 percent of proposed US 
outbound deals were inversions.”). 
 6. See Larson, supra note 3 (“Will inversions continue? Yes, just ask Pfizer . . . .”); Jim 
Puzzanghera & Samantha Masunaga, Pfizer and Allergan’s $160-billion pharmaceutical merger 
puts new twist on tax-avoiding inversions, L.A. TIMES, (Nov. 23, 2015, 9:35 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pfizer-allergan-merger-20151123-story.html (“New 
Treasury Department regulations, including ones issued just last week, have made the tactic 
somewhat more difficult. But the Pfizer-Allergan deal is structured as a foreign acquisition to 
avoid those rules.”); Press Release, Kirkland & Ellis, U.S. Treasury and Internal Revenue Service 
Issue New Anti-Inversion Guidance (Nov. 2015), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/
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was no reason to think that 2016 would be any different7 until 
Treasury released two sets of proposed and temporary regulations on 
April 4, 2016.8 One set of regulations further broadened the 
definition of “inversion transactions” subject to the unfriendly 
strictures of section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code,9 while the 
other greatly restricted the circumstances under which related party 
debt would be recognized as “debt” for tax purposes.10 Although the 
tax bar and their corporate clients were stunned by the sweep of these 
regulations,11 the future of inversion transactions remains uncertain. 
 
Publications/112315.pdf (“Indeed, on November 23, 2015, Pfizer Inc. announced its 
combination with Allergan PLC in the largest inversion transaction ever announced. On 
November 19, 2015, the Treasury and the IRS launched their latest attack on inversion 
transactions by issuing Notice 2015-79 . . . .”). 
 7. TYCO and Johnson Controls announced their intention to merge, with the survivor 
a foreign corporation, on January 25, 2016. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Tidal Wave of Corporate 
Migrants Seeking (Tax) Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2016, at B1 (“By my count, based on a 
series of conversations with investment bankers, there are probably at least another dozen deals 
of meaningful size being negotiated in the pipeline.”). 
 8. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion 
Regulations and Proposed Earnings Stripping Regulations (Apr. 4, 2016), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0404.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Fact 
Sheet I] (describing proposed and temporary regulations). A final version of the earnings 
stripping portion of the regulations was issued on October 13, 2016.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treas., Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Final Earnings Stripping Regulations (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0579.aspx [hereinafter 
Treasury Fact Sheet II]. 
 9. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7, 1.367(a)-3, 1.367(b)-4, 1.956-2, 1.7701(l)-4, 
1.7874-1, 1.7874-2, 1.7874-3, 1.7874-4, 1.7874-6, 1.7874-7, 1.7874-8, 1.7874-9, 1.7874-
10, 1.7874-11, 1.7874-12 Fed. Reg. 20588, 20589–91 (Apr. 8, 2016) (as amended by T.D. 
9761, 2016-20 I.R.B. 743), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/04/08/2016-
07299/inversions-and-related-transactions. 
 10. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1, 1.385-2, 1.385-3, 1.385-4 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20930–
43 (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/08/2016-
07425/treatment-of-certain-interests-in-corporations-as-stock-or-indebtedness [hereinafter 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under Section 385]. The final and temporary version of these 
regulations were promulgated on October 13, 2016. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1, 1.385-2, 
1.385-3, 1.385-4, 81 Fed Reg. 72,858, 72,950–84 (Oct. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/10/21/2016-25105/treatment-
of-certain-interests-in-corporations-as-stock-or-indebtedness [hereinafter Final Section 
385 Regulations]. 
 11. See Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan Said to End Merger 
as Tax Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, at B1 (“‘We are surprised, to say the least, that 
Treasury took the drastic step of proposing such a punitive rule, apparently without the authority 
to do so,’ Robert Willens, an independent tax consultant, wrote in a note to clients on 
Tuesday.”); id. (“‘These rules are going to apply much more broadly than people had expected,’ 
said Stephen L. Gordon, the head of the tax department at the law firm Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore.”); Victor Fleischer, Treasury Department Takes Off the Gloves on Corporate Inversions, 
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Pfizer and Allergan called off their pending deal,12 but many experts 
believed not only that the other inversion transactions already in the 
pipeline would be consummated, but that additional inversion deals 
would take place.13 
After all, most of the financial benefits of inversion transactions 
remain available despite the latest (proposed and actual) regulatory 
changes. With the right inversion partner, a (formerly) U.S. company 
can substitute a territorial system of taxation of the sort adopted by 
most developed countries for the U.S. system of world-wide 
taxation.14 Given that U.S. corporate tax rates may be among the 
highest in the world,15 that substitution of taxing regimes could 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, at B4 (“The proposed regulations are more aggressive and expansive 
than the Treasury’s earlier volleys, venturing into at least two areas where its legal authority 
seems likely to be challenged.”); Press Release, Morrison Forester, Proposed IRS Debt-Equity 
Regulations: Aimed at Post-Inversion “Earnings Stripping,” But May Also Impact Ordinary 
Related-Party Debt (April 12, 2016), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/
160412irsdebtequityregulations.pdf (“The Proposed Regulations were unexpected and have 
been immediately controversial.”). 
 12. See de la Merced & Picker, supra note 11 (“Pfizer plans to abandon its $152 billion 
merger with Allergan . . . just days after the Obama administration introduced new tax rules, a 
person briefed on the matter said late Tuesday.”). 
 13. See Andrew Velarde, Johnson Controls Goes ‘Full Steam Ahead’ with Tyco Inversion, 151 
TAX NOTES 413 (2016) (Johnson Controls CEO Molinaroli stated “that the new regs would 
affect the company’s tax planning, but that global tax benefits were not limited exclusively to 
the United States and would still be achievable” as a result of the inversion transaction); de la 
Merced & Picker, supra note 11 (“There is perhaps less of a probability that Treasury’s new rules 
will derail any of the other six inversion deals that are still pending, according to analysts . . . .”); 
Tom Murphy, Experts expect corporate tax inversions to survive new rules, 
PHYS.ORG  (Apr.  6,  2016), http://phys.org/news/2016-04-experts-corporate-tax-
inversions-survive.html (“[S]ome narrowly tailored deals that have the right balance of U.S. and 
foreign ownership should survive . . . [such as] the pending $14.6 billion combination of 
Milwaukee-based Johnson Controls Inc. and Ireland’s Tyco International . . . .”). 
 14. See Sorkin, supra note 7 (“Ultimately, the only way inversions will stop is when the 
corporate tax code changes so it becomes more attractive for American companies to be 
American companies.”); Martin Sullivan, Don’t Count On Tax Reform to Stop Inversions, FORBES 
(Aug. 5, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/08/05/dont-
count-on-tax-reform-to-stop-inversions/#656942af2df3 (“In the press and on Capitol Hill, the 
conventional wisdom is that inversions occur because Congress has failed to enact tax reform. 
The United States has a high corporate tax rate and a worldwide system.”). 
 15. Statutory U.S. corporate tax rates are relatively high. See Summerfield, supra note 2 
(“In the US, the federal and state level of corporate tax combined reached 39 percent, well above 
the OECD average of 25 percent.”). There is considerable dispute, however, as to whether its 
effective tax rates—let alone the rates payable on foreign sourced income—are higher or lower 
than average. See also Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do with It, 144 
TAX NOTES 1055, 1057 (2014) (“As a result, whether one measures effective marginal or overall 
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provide a significant financial advantage. Indeed, many regard 
inversions as no more than the home-made territoriality necessary to 
ensure that U.S. owned corporations can operate on a “level playing 
field” with foreign-owned corporations operating under 
territorial regimes.16 
But the advantages of inversions—and foreign ownership of U.S. 
companies in general—go beyond reducing tax rates on foreign 
sourced income to the (say) European average because the United 
States (like some other countries) currently fails to exercise meaningful 
territorial taxing jurisdiction.17 Rather than reducing 
multijurisdictional tax claims to a single, source-based tax, inversion 
transactions often can be used to generate “stateless income” which is 
not taxed anywhere.18 To make inversions unattractive, then, the 
United States must first deal with the more general problem of the 
undertaxation of foreign-owned U.S. corporations, whether or not 
“inverted.” It must actually tax the U.S. source income earned by all 
foreign-owned multinationals.19 
 
tax rates, sophisticated U.S. multinational firms are burdened by tax rates that are the envy of 
their international peers.”). 
 16. See Editorial, How to stop the inversion perversion, ECONOMIST (July 26, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21608751-restricting-companies-moving-abroad-
no-substitute-corporate-tax-reform-how-stop (“America’s corporate tax has two horrible flaws. 
The first is the tax rate . . . . The second flaw is that America levies tax on a company’s income no 
matter where in the world it is earned.”); Scott A. Hodge, The Simple Solution to the Pfizer Deal: 
Cut the Rate and Move to a Territorial Tax System, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 24, 2015), http:// 
taxfoundation.org/blog/simple-solution-pfizer-deal-cut-rate-and-move-territorial-tax-system. 
 17. See Sullivan, supra note 14. 
 18. Edward Kleinbard has done an excellent job of explaining the phenomenon of—and 
the mechanics of creating— “stateless income,” and there is no need to repeat it in this article. 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011). 
 19. I am among those who have argued for the necessity of increasing taxes on foreigners 
earning income in the United States, though not specifically for the purpose of discouraging 
inversion transactions. See Julie A. Roin, Can Income from Capital Be Taxed? An International 
Perspective, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 211, 235 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007) (“To 
combat such tax evasion, the United States will have to increase its taxation of foreigners’ U.S.-
sourced capital income . . . .”); Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls 
of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 170 (2008) (“It is hard 
to see how the corporate, and perhaps even the individual, income tax can survive as an effective 
revenue-raising device unless countries devise an effective method of taxing the domestic income 
of foreign corporations.”). Those who argue for increased taxation at source particularly to stem 
inversion transactions include: Kleinbard, supra note 15, at 1068; Steven E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, 
Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate Expatriations, 144 TAX NOTES 473 (2014); Willard B. 
Taylor, Letter to the Editor, A Comment on Eric Solomon’s Article on Corporate Inversions, 137 
TAX NOTES 105 (2012); Bret Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate 
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This Article looks at the steps the United States could take to 
increase its taxation of U.S. source income, and whether those steps 
would in fact dissipate the incentive for U.S. multinational enterprises, 
or “MNEs,” to engage in inversion transactions—or for foreign 
corporations to acquire U.S. MNEs. Its conclusions are at least 
somewhat dispiriting for fans of the corporate (and perhaps) income 
tax. Not only would devising rules that effectively tax income at source 
be technically demanding and in some cases impossible, but doing so 
would at best only partially eliminate the incentives for inversion 
transactions. In addition, the changes may drive some businesses 
operations currently carried out in the United States to other, lower 
tax countries. These risks would be reduced, of course, if other 
developed countries made similar changes in their tax laws and treaty 
practices. But there is no guarantee that this will occur. For all the 
apparent recent advances in the OECD’s BEPS project,20 when it 
comes to actual legal change, countries seem to be moving in the 
opposite direction with, for example, the adoption of patent 
box regimes.21 
This does not mean that the United States should not take steps 
to increase taxation at source. Residence-based taxation is becoming 
increasingly untenable as globalized securities markets eliminate the 
 
Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429 (2012); Bret Wells, Corporate Inversions and Whack-a-Mole Tax 
Policy, 143 TAX NOTES 1429 (2014). 
 20. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or “OECD”, and 
the G20 launched the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013 in an effort to 
develop a coordinated response to tax avoidance activities and opportunities. See About BEPS 
and the inclusive framework, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2016). A “BEPS package” of 15 “actions” was presented to the G20 Leaders at 
their November 2015 summit in hopes that they would be able to convince their governments 
to enact legislation to implement them. See id. 
 21. Patent box regimes provide special tax benefits for profits derived from intellectual 
property rights. Typically, they provide for the taxation of such income at preferential rates 
provided that some of the associated research and development activities occur in-country. See 
Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and 
the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 363–69 (2013) 
(describing tax regimes). The EC recently determined that these regimes would not be 
considered to constitute either “state aid” or “harmful tax competition” as long as they require 
“substantial” economic activity in the jurisdiction. See DLA PIPER, EU PATENT BOX REGIMES—
THE WAY AHEAD (Feb. 15, 2015), http://information.dla.com/information/
published/EU_Patent_Box_Regimes.pdf (countries in Europe with such regimes include the 
UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, France, and Hungary). For a criticism of 
such regimes, see Graetz & Doud, supra, at 375 (“Given the mobility of IP income, one cannot 
help but conclude that firms are more likely to shift income eligible for patent box treatment to 
low-tax jurisdictions than to increase local R&D in response to patent box tax breaks.”). 
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barriers that used to prevent taxpayers from becoming residents of 
countries levying little or no income tax. If countries abandon source 
taxation as well, the end game is clear: there will be no corporate 
income tax.22 By contrast, if countries such as the United States tax 
more of the income that is generated within their borders—that is, 
they actually exercise territorial jurisdiction—corporate tax revenue 
may increase and the incentive to engage in inversion transactions and 
other tax motivated ownership changes will decrease.23 Unfortunately, 
the deleterious incentives will not disappear. Ultimately, the benefits 
(and costs) of such tax changes will be determined by the strength of 
the “frictions” or nontax impediments to tax avoidance behavior. And 
it is very hard to measure that in advance. 
This Article consists of four parts. Part I explains the dangers of 
relying on residence for the taxation of business entities. Part II 
explains the current undertaxation of foreign investors. Part III 
explains the steps that can be taken to correct this undertaxation and 
their likely effects. Part IV concludes. 
I. THE DEATH OF RESIDENCE COUNTRY TAXATION 
There are two24 distinct bases for asserting jurisdiction to tax 
income derived from transnational transactions: source and 
 
 22. Whether one believes that to be a serious problem depends on one’s belief in the likely 
effectiveness and political acceptability of an integrated tax system which attempts to collect the 
tax on corporate income at the shareholder level. Some have proposed taxing regimes that would 
bring the treatment of income derived by corporate entities closer to that accorded to income 
derived by partnerships and other flow-through entities. See, e.g., Robert A. Green, The Future 
of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 
70–74 (1993) (describing the operation of a pass-through system for the taxation of income 
derived by corporate entities in the international context); Bret Wells, International Tax Reform 
by Means of Corporate Integration, FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming Fall 2016) (manuscript at 5 
n.15) (on file with author) (listing integration proposals and studies). 
 23. The importance of “capital ownership neutrality” and “national ownership neutrality” 
to economic efficiency was laid out in a seminal article by Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., 
Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003). Their particular tax policy 
recommendations remain open to dispute. See Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, 
Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53, 55–56 
(2006) (“This paper claims that the analysis of Desai and Hines, though valuable as a first step 
in modeling tax distortions to ownership, must be expanded to take account of many real world 
complications before drawing any concrete conclusions regarding policy prescriptions.”). 
 24. The United States insists on a third basis for taxing jurisdiction with respect to natural 
persons—citizenship. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(A) (2012) (including “a citizen” within the 
definition of a U.S. person for tax purposes). However, that view is not shared by the 
overwhelming majority of other countries. See Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global 
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residence.25 For much of the history of the income tax, the question 
was how to split the tax revenue derived from such transactions 
between the two claimants, as both source and residence countries 
plausibly maintained that they provided some of the services and 
conditions necessary for such income to have been earned.26 However, 
countries soon learned that they could profit from providing residency 
status to corporate and other legal entities in the absence of substantial 
business or ownership ties. Such countries encourage firms to become 
“residents” by promising to levy few or no taxes27 and by imposing 
minimal fees, a strategy made economically plausible by the fact that 
the governmental services rendered to these new “residents” may be 
equally minimal or absent.28 In the absence of nontax reasons to 
 
Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 445 (2007) (“On this issue, the United States has long been 
an outlier in the international community.”). 
 25. See MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1–3 to 1–4 (1992) (discussing “competing claims for tax revenue based on 
residence and source”); AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL 
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 6 (1987) (“Jurisdiction to tax the income of a 
person or an entity may be based on . . . domicile or residence . . . . Jurisdiction to tax may also 
be based on the source of the income subject to tax . . . .”). 
 26. See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy: Stages 
in the Development of International Income Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 631, 644 (2008) (“[T]he 
bone of contention between sovereigns during the Revenue Phase [from the end of WWI until 
the end of WWII] related to the allocation of the revenue base.”); Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, 
Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Residence vs. Source, 5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2013) 
[hereinafter Wells & Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy] (“The primacy of residence in treaty 
policy has persisted through the global economic evolution of the post-World War II and Cold 
War eras . . . . As the economies of the BRICS and other Source Countries matured in the late 
twentieth century, resistance to the subordination of source to residence as the means of 
allocating residual income has been reflected in the evolution of their domestic tax policies.”). 
For a complete exegesis of the development of tax treaty policy and the apparent acceptance, at 
least since 1951, of its potential to create “stateless income”, see Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax 
Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at Source Is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535 
(2012) [hereinafter Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion]. 
 27. Many view the adoption of territorial taxation as an attempt to lure MNE residents. 
See Wells & Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy, supra note 26, at 35 (“[T]he trend toward 
territorial taxation . . . which results from countries competing with one another for MNE 
headquarters locations, amounts to an international race to the tax bottom.”). 
 28. See Adam Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 
955–56 (2010) (explaining how tax havens derive financial benefits from “selling income tax 
benefits to foreign investors”). One recent commentator suggests that these financial benefits 
may not be as beneficial as their proponents imagine. See Kleinbard, supra note 15, at 1067 
(“The reason Ireland is not picking up significant tax revenues from these deals,[is] because in 
fact nothing changes . . . . But the larger revenues of the expanded Irish parent company are 
treated as Irish for gross national product purposes, which has the consequence of increasing 
Ireland’s share of EU budget costs.”). Ireland may have been an exceptional situation and one, 
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maintain their residency in higher tax jurisdictions, enterprises are 
open to such invitations. Sometimes with and sometimes without the 
explicit connivance of source countries,29 such “tax haven” countries 
enable increasing numbers of taxpayers to avoid paying tax on that 
portion of their income allocated, by statutory law or by treaty, to 
residence countries.30 Hence the rise in inversion transactions and the 
attraction of “greenfield” foreign incorporations, even for enterprises 
with (or planning on) substantial U.S. operations. And unfortunately, 
as described below, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to put 
this genie back into its bottle. Corporations may too easily become 
residents of low-tax countries, while too few nontax benefits accrue 
from U.S. residence. 
A. The Definition of Corporate Residency 
Corporations are legal fictions; their existence and characteristics 
are determined by the laws under which they are created. Most 
countries, and certainly all even semi-developed countries, have laws 
providing for the formation and regulation of corporate (or corporate-
like) legal entities. They also have laws establishing how legal entities 
can establish residence for tax purposes. In the United States, the rule 
is that residence depends on the country of incorporation. If a 
corporation is incorporated in the United States, or in a state of the 
United States, the corporation is considered a U.S. resident for tax 
purposes;31 all other corporations are considered “foreign 
 
moreover, that has been retroactively reversed by an EU decision to treat these favorable tax 
rules as prohibited “state aid.” See European Commission Press Release 16/2926, Statement by 
Commissioner Vestager on state aid decision that Ireland’s tax benefits for Apple were illegal 
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2926_en.htm. The 
recent growth in patent box regimes, see Graetz & Doud, supra note 21, at 363–69, suggests 
that the list of countries willing to act as tax havens may be expanding rather than contracting. 
 29. As is detailed in the next section, the success of many (but not all) tax reduction 
schemes relies on the existence of a tax treaty between the country of residence and the country 
of source. High-tax countries could revoke or renegotiate their treaties with low-tax countries 
to avoid such outcomes; instead, many continue their treaty arrangements but enact complex 
side-regimes, such as the United States’ subpart F regime, contained at I.R.C. §§ 951–965, 
which only partially undercut some of their deleterious effects. Or, as in the case of patent boxes, 
they simply accede to such behavior. See infra text accompanying notes 186–87 (describing the 
2016 U.S. Model Treaty’s treatment of patent boxes). 
 30. This is the phenomenon so aptly described by Ed Kleinbard as the creation of 
“stateless income.” See Kleinbard, supra note 18, at 700. 
 31. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012). 
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corporations.”32 Once a corporation has established itself as a U.S. 
resident, the “anti-inversion” rules33 make it somewhat difficult for 
corporations to switch from U.S. residency to foreign residency,34 but 
there are no formal impediments to the initial incorporation of a 
business venture owned by U.S. citizens and carried out in the United 
States as a foreign corporation. And as is explained next, there is very 
little that compels those thinking about undertaking new business 
ventures to do so through a U.S., as opposed to a foreign, 
corporation. Indeed, if the United States increases its restrictions on 
inversion transactions, there is every reason to think that one reaction 
will be an increase in the number of businesses that begin as foreign 
enterprises.35 Once that happens, residence country tax will become 
little more than a “transition tax” on “trapped” capital.36 
B. The Non-Tax Market for Corporate Residency 
Although it has always been easy, as a formal matter, for 
businesses—even those wholly owned by U.S. persons and those 
operated exclusively in the United States—to incorporate abroad, 
most U.S. business enterprises never thought of doing so. There were 
 
 32. Id. § 7701(a)(5). 
 33. Id. §§ 4985, 7874. 
 34. Congress attempted to stop inversion transactions in 2004 by enacting I.R.C. § 7874. 
However, that provision has been, at best, only partially effective. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et 
al., Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytic Framework, 
93 N.C. L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2015) (recognizing that “there has been considerable discussion 
regarding the appropriate response” to the provision’s flaws); Gary M. Friedman, The Discreet 
Charm of the Inversion Rules, 144 TAX NOTES 1147 (2014) (describing rules and their flaws); 
Kleinbard, supra note 15, at 1068 (describing measures necessary to make anti-inversion rules 
effective). It remains to be seen whether the more recently proposed anti-inversion regulations, 
see supra note 8, are more successful. 
 35. See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Do Strong Fences Make Strong 
Neighbors?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 723, 724 (2010) (“This paper takes a first step towards 
providing . . . evidence” of the effect of incentives for foreign incorporation.); Daniel Shaviro, 
The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX 
L. REV. 377, 378 (2011) (“I have heard U.S. tax lawyers joke that recommending (or even not 
objecting to) U.S. incorporation of an intended global business verges on being malpractice per 
se.”). Although one study indicates that most of the tax haven entities conducting recent U.S. 
IPOs were Chinese-headquartered, not U.S. headquartered firms, see Eric J. Allen & Susan C. 
Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L TAX 
J. 395, 396 (2013) (firms headquartered in China and Hong Kong largely responsible for the 
increase in tax haven firms conducting U.S. IPOs), the study period ended in 2010, before the 
latest rounds of Treasury’s anti-inversion notices. 
 36. Shaviro, supra note 35, at 379–80. 
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compelling non-tax business reasons for using a U.S. corporate or 
other legal vehicle—chiefly unfettered access to the U.S. securities 
markets and the country’s distinguished history of corporate 
governance. Unfortunately, those non-tax business reasons have 
largely disappeared, making the adoption of foreign status for tax 
purposes more attractive. 
1. The globalization of the securities markets 
Foreign firms have long had the ability to seek U.S. investors 
through the U.S. securities markets. J.P. Morgan devised the 
“American Depository Receipt,” or ADR, to allow U.S. investors 
effectively to purchase shares of foreign companies through U.S. 
exchanges in 1927.37 Foreign firms were also allowed to cross-list their 
shares on U.S. exchanges if they met the same disclosure requirements 
as U.S. firms. However, relatively few firms bothered to do so because 
the significant costs of complying with the U.S. securities laws38 
outweighed the probable benefits, given U.S. investors’ reluctance to 
invest in foreign equities, wherever those equities were listed.39 
 
 37. American Depository Receipt, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_
depositary_receipt (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). An ADR is a negotiable instrument issued by a 
U.S. bank and represents an ownership interest in foreign securities (usually equities) deposited 
in a foreign financial institution. See Mark A. Saunders, American Depository Receipts: An 
Introduction to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 48, 49 
(1993) (describing ADRs). ADRs come in two varieties, “sponsored” and “unsponsored.” 
Unsponsored ADRs are created by brokers. Sponsored ADRs are created jointly by a foreign 
private issuer and a depository. That issuer signs the registration forms required by the SEC 
before the ADRs can be traded and enters into a contract with the depository setting forth not 
only the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties, but also the depository’s fee structure 
for its interaction with investors. Sponsorship provides the foreign issuer with more control over 
the depository; it also often reduces the costs of the arrangement borne by U.S. investors. For 
example, under many sponsorship agreements, the depository may not deduct a fee for paying 
out dividends. See id. at 55–57 (describing the difference between sponsored and unsponsored 
ADRs). The American and New York Stock Exchange do not list unsponsored ADRs. Id. at 57. 
There are, in turn, several classes of sponsored ADRs, depending on the level of scrutiny they 
subject themselves to under U.S. securities laws. To be traded on anything other than the OTC 
market, an ADR must be a Sponsored Level II or III. See American Depositary Receipt, supra. 
 38. See Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on the 
Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 621–23 (2010) (describing 
securities law impediments to listing). 
 39. U.S. investors were not alone in being remarkably unwilling to invest in anything 
other than domestic firms. See Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba, Investor Diversification 
and International Equity Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 222, 222 (1991) (“The domestic 
ownership shares of the world’s five largest stock markets are: United States, 92.2 percent; Japan, 
95.7 percent; United Kingdom, 92 percent; Germany, 79 percent; and France, 89.4 percent.”). 
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Both the costs and benefits of cross-listing shifted in the 1990s. 
The SEC, largely at the behest of the NYSE, reduced its disclosure 
requirements for foreign issuers,40 making it easier and cheaper for 
such firms to be listed there. At the same time, home bias began to 
decrease,41 a trend that has continued, making it easier for foreign 
firms to attract U.S. investors.42 Significant numbers of foreign firms 
began listing in the U.S. exchanges43 and the amount U.S. investors 
invested in foreign firms through these exchanges grew.44 In short, 
U.S. residency became much less important for those eager to access 
the rich capital markets in the United States made available through 
its exchanges. 
Over the same period, the importance of those exchanges 
declined. Although most U.S. investors in foreign equities continue 
to favor firms cross-listed (or available in ADR form) on U.S. 
 
At the end of 1989, foreign stocks comprised 6.2 percent of U.S. investors’ equity 
investments. Id. 
 40. See Davidoff, supra note 38, at 623–25 (describing the development of a “new 
architecture” of “mutual recognition” attributable to “shifting market forces”). However, the 
costs of listing on a U.S. stock exchange remain significant. See Richard Dobbs & Marc H. 
Goedhart, Why cross-listing shares doesn’t create value, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/corporate-finance/why_cross-listing_shares_doesnt_cre
ate_value (describing costs). 
 41. See MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 312 (2008) (noting 
“the ‘home bias’ of investment is therefore declining”); Amir A. Amadi, Equity Home Bias: A 
Disappearing Phenomenon?, 2 (May 5, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=540662 (“[F]rom 1986 to 2001, international diversification has increased in 
almost every country.”). 
 42. See Rick Kahler, U.S. Investors’ Home Bias, NASDAQ (July 23, 2015, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/us-investors-home-bias-cm499769 (“[I]n 2014, a quarter of 
new cash put into American mutual funds went to overseas-oriented mutual funds. That’s up 
from 15% in 2004 . . . .”); INT’L MONETARY FUND, Long-Term Investors and Their Asset 
Allocation: Where Are They Now?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: GRAPPLING WITH 
CRISIS LEGACIES 55 (2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/02/
pdf/text.pdf (“[T]he longer-term developments in global asset allocation show . . . slowly 
declining home bias . . . .”). 
 43. See Davidoff, supra note 38, at 625–26. 
 44. The market value of U.S. holdings of foreign securities more than doubled between 
December 2001 and December 2009. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON U.S. 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN SECURITIES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009 3 (2010), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/claimsreport 10_27_2010 
withappendixtables.pdf (Table 1: 2317 billion to 5977 billion). Foreign investment also grew as 
a proportion of total equity wealth held by U.S. investors. See Matthew M. Wynter, Why Has the 
U.S. Foreign Portfolio Share Increased?, 2 (Aug. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2679196  
(“In 1994 the U.S. foreign portfolio share was 16.794%; by 2010, it rose to 28.150%.”). 
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exchanges,45 changes in technology and regulation are leading more 
large investors to trade on foreign exchanges46 while others have 
moved to invest through private placements, which avoid exchanges 
entirely.47 Small investors, meanwhile, have increasingly channeled 
their investments in equity, including foreign stock, through mutual 
funds,48 which have the capacity to buy shares on foreign exchanges.49 
The result of these changes in the securities markets means that 
businesses no longer fear adverse market repercussions from 
inverting—or from failing to establish a U.S. residence to begin with. 
They can access U.S. capital as foreign firms almost as easily as 
domestic firms.50 The market access advantages enjoyed by U.S. 
 
 45. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers No. 1044, 
John Ammer et al., U.S. International Equity Investment 2, 4–5 (2012), www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1044/ifdp1044.htm [hereinafter U.S. International Equity 
Investment] (“Median U.S. investment in cross-listed firms is 13.6 percent of the firm’s market 
capitalization, dwarfing the 0.3 percent median holdings in non-cross-listed firms.” The authors 
note, however, that “the majority of U.S. investors do not even use the U.S. market to acquire 
foreign shares of cross-listed firms; rather they acquire the shares in the firms’ home market.”); 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers No. 815, Look at Me 
Now: The Role of Cross-Listing in Attracting U.S. Investors 33 (2004), www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/815/ifdp815.htm (“[F]irms can increase their U.S. holdings by 
8 to 11 percent of their market capitalization by cross-listing in the United States, doubling or 
more the amount prior to cross-listing.”). 
 46. See Dobbs & Goedhart, supra note 40 (“[A]s capital markets become increasingly 
global, institutional investors typically invest in stocks they find attractive, no matter where those 
stocks are listed. One large US investor—CalPERS—has an international equity portfolio of 
around 2,400 companies, for example, but less than 10 percent of them have a US cross-
listing.”). But see U.S. International Equity Investment, supra note 45, at 5 (“U.S. investors seem 
most attracted to cross-listed firms that become more informationally transparent following the 
cross-listing, particularly those firms with poor accounting practices prior to listing in the 
United States.”). 
 47. See Davidoff, supra note 38, at 628 (“[T]he rise of private and more complete equity 
markets . . . provided an alternative capital raising outlet. In the private realm, the market for 
foreign equity . . . in the U.S. exploded. . . . It was clear that a viable market alternative now 
existed in the United States to raise capital outside the public listing markets.”). 
 48. See Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? 
An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 605, 610 (2014) (“Mutual funds 
are the dominant investment vehicle for retail investors.”); INV. CO. INST., 2015 INVESTMENT 
COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT 
COMPANY INDUSTRY 8, 27–28 (55th ed. 2015), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf 
(showing 56% of U.S. mutual fund and exchange-traded fund assets at year-end 2014 were 
equities; 42% of total assets were comprised of shares of domestic corporations while shares in 
non-U.S. corporations accounted for 14% of total assets, or 25% of equity mutual fund assets). 
 49. See sources cited supra note 46. 
 50. See Martin Phelan et al., Pharma and Irish inversions: Increasing your share price, INT’L 
TAX REV. (June 1, 2014), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3348569/Pharma-
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firms—and increasingly the U.S. exchanges51—are 
swiftly disappearing. 
But it was not just access to U.S. investors that domestic firms 
prized; it was also their access to high quality (and familiar) corporate 
governance standards. In short, Delaware.52 Yet that advantage, too, 
has been dissipating. 
2. The globalization of corporate governance 
The internal affairs of corporations are largely governed by the 
laws of the state (or nation) of which they are residents. For many 
years, it was taken as a given (at least in the United States) that U.S. 
corporate governance standards were the highest in the world. That 
may well have been one source of U.S. investors’ “home bias”; U.S. 
shareholders were certain that their interests would be respected in the 
course of corporate affairs as long as they invested in U.S. 
corporations.53 In addition, the SEC was touted for forcing greater 
 
and-Irish-inversions-Increasing-your-share-price.html (“In general, companies which have 
undertaken corporate inversions have noted an increase in share prices . . . .”). 
 51. As trading on U.S. exchanges becomes a less important prerequisite for gaining access 
to U.S. investors, the dangers of relying on U.S. listing status as a marker of tax residence, a 
move suggested by some, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Formulary Apportionment in the U.S. 
International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–24 
(2014) (advocating use as “rebuttable presumption” for determining U.S. residence), become 
more apparent. It may do little to increase tax revenue while subverting what is (for better or 
worse) a major component of the U.S. economy, the financial sector. 
 52. More than sixty percent of domestic corporations are incorporated in Delaware. The 
reasons for this phenomenon are disputed. For the last forty years, U.S. legal academics have 
argued over whether Delaware won out over other states in a “race-to-the-bottom” by unjustly 
catering to managerial interests, see, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State 
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1783 (2002) (not a race; Delaware has 
a monopoly); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L. J. 663, 663–65 (1974) (race to the bottom), or in a “race-to-the-top” by successfully 
balancing shareholder interests and business needs, see generally Roberta Romano, Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 281 (1985) 
(Delaware’s prominence in corporate charter market “a matter of efficiency”); Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 
289–92 (1977) (race-to-the-top). Others have argued that its successes have been due less to 
the contents of its laws (which have been copied wholesale by some other states) than to network 
externalities or the quality of the state’s corporate bar and judiciary. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & 
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 738–39 
(2002); William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
570, 571. 
 53. See Stefan Eichler, Equity home bias and corporate disclosure, 31 J. INT’L MONEY & 
FIN. 1008, 1008 (2012) (showing that information asymmetries caused by inadequate corporate 
disclosure can result in “home bias” investing). Of course, if the critics of Delaware’s legal 
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financial transparency, among other shareholder protections, as a 
condition of trading on U.S. exchanges.54 Companies incorporated in 
Delaware55 and listed on U.S. stock exchanges56 to convince 
prospective shareholders that they were “good actors” and thus, good 
investment opportunities. The assumption was that any costs 
associated with such actions (both regulatory and tax) would be more 
than offset by the additional value shareholders were willing to ascribe 
to the shares of such entities. Recently, however, some have argued 
that the corporate governance rationale for maintaining U.S. residence 
status has dissipated. There are several grounds for believing that this 
may be true. 
The first is the increasing “federalization” of corporate governance 
as a result of the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley57 and Dodd-Frank.58 
These federal laws incorporate many of the corporate governance rules 
formerly imposed under state level incorporation statutes and require 
their application to all corporations listed on U.S. exchanges.59 
Corporations can demonstrate good corporate governance by listing 
on a U.S. exchange rather than incorporating in Delaware. And as 
explained in the previous section, corporations do not have to be U.S. 
residents to be listed on a U.S. exchange. Thus, there is no need to go 
the further step of maintaining a Delaware (or other U.S.) residency 
 
regime—those arguing that it is slanted in the direction of protecting managerial rather than 
shareholder interests—are correct, see supra note 52, these investors could well have 
been  misguided. 
 54. See Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 
101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1691–92 (2015) (explaining that “the bonding hypothesis continues to 
have significant support in the academic community” as a driver of cross-listings). 
 55. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 
533 (2001) (explaining that Delaware law enhances shareholder value by five percent); Talley, 
supra note 54, at 1690–91 (“Empirically, the proposition that Delaware law creates value (at 
least historically) enjoys some support.”); Steven Lipin, Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are 
Valued More by Investors, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 28, 2000), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB951694281741477590 (referring to Daines study). 
 56. See Talley, supra note 54 (“[S]ubstantial empirical evidence suggests that listing in 
U.S. securities markets is associated with positive and persistent economic value creation. . . . 
Some of this literature suggests that a key driver of this market premium comes through 
‘bonding’ of foreign firms to the more demanding standards (including those related to 
corporate governance) in the United States.”). 
 57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 58. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 59. See Talley, supra note 54, at 1694–97 (listing federal mandates). 
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because foreign companies can “bond” themselves to good corporate 
governance standards merely by listing themselves on U.S. 
exchanges.60 They can prove their willingness to abide by good 
governance standards to potential investors while maintaining the 
favorable tax status of a foreign corporation. 
The second (and more troubling) reason to discount the lure of 
good governance standards as a path to residency is that the standards 
of corporate governance in other countries have improved sufficiently 
to challenge U.S. (and Delaware’s) dominance.61 This argument is 
particularly attractive to those who believe that some of the recent 
changes to federal law under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank amount 
to “overregulation”;62 in their view, U.S. corporate governance 
standards have gone down just as other countries’ standards have 
gone up. 
Whether one believes that Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank were 
positive or negative developments, the bottom line is much the same. 
The corporate governance benefits accruing to U.S. corporate 
residents (and their investors) are no longer unique enough to 
overcome the substantial tax detriments of U.S. residency.63 As much 
as one might wish otherwise, there is no easy way of going back to the 
world in which taxpayers have the opposite calculus. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible to change the U.S. residency rules to do so. 
C. Changing the Definition of Corporate Residence 
As noted above, the U.S. definition of corporate residence is 
purely formal in nature; residence depends on the country in which 
the entity is incorporated. The choice of residence thus lies wholly 
within the control of the incorporators, and can be exercised to 
maximize whatever benefits those incorporators choose to maximize. 
 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 1699 (“To the extent that federal law has appropriated from Delaware 
(and other states) large sectors of corporate governance jurisprudence, most of the benefits from 
domestic incorporation can be retained simply by remaining listed in U.S. securities markets 
(governed by federal securities laws).”). 
 61. See Dobbs & Goedhart, supra note 40 (“However, other developed economies . . . 
have radically improved their own corporate-governance requirements.”). 
 62. See Davidoff, supra note 38, at 629 (“In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, a skein of 
academic literature, supported by industry commentary expressed an opinion that provisions of 
the Act were ham-handed, over-broad, and too costly.”). 
 63. See Talley, supra note 54, at 1652 (“[T]he recent pace of inversion activity plausibly 
suggests that America’s traditional market power in regulatory competition has begun to slip.”). 
1837 Inversions, Related Party Expenditures, and Source Taxation 
 1853 
Some have contended that the proper response to the impending (if 
not actual) death of residency taxation is for the United States to adopt 
a more substantive residency rule, one which would make it much 
harder for entities with substantial U.S. contacts to avoid U.S. tax 
residence and thus tax obligations.64 
Some other countries have more substantive rules. For example, 
some determine residence based on the location of the corporate 
management—a term defined variously as the country in which the 
board of directors meetings are held65 or the country in which the 
home office is located.66 Unfortunately, experience has shown that 
 
 64. See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 51, at 22 (“We believe this demonstrates that the 
United States should seriously consider broadening its definition of a resident corporation to 
provide that foreign corporations are U.S. tax residents if they satisfy either a shareholder 
residency test or the presently controlling place of incorporation test.”); Michael S. Kirsch, The 
Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in 
the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 583 (2005) (“[I]f the place-
of-incorporation rule fails accurately to reflect legislators’ and the public’s understanding of what 
makes a corporation American, that definition should be revisited across-the-board . . . . Possible 
alternatives include a focus on the residence of the corporation’s shareholders . . . or a focus on 
the place of the corporation’s management and control.”); Reuven Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: 
Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1797 (2002) (advocating 
replacement of place-of-incorporation with “managed and controlled” test for 
corporate residency). 
 65. See HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL 
ANALYSIS 371–73 (1997) (noting that in 1997 the United Kingdom, Canada, and the 
Netherlands applied effective management and control tests that focused on the meeting 
location of the board of directors). This test seems to be falling out of international favor. See 
Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1629 & n.63 (2013) 
(describing the OECD’s move away from the place of board meeting test). 
 66. The commentary on the July 14, 2015, version of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital describes the preferred test for corporate residence as “the ‘place of 
effective management’ . . . the place where key management and commercial decisions that are 
necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made.” OECD, 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAP.: CONDENSED VERSION 2014, 
Commentary on Article 4, ¶ 24, at 90–91, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239081-en 
[hereinafter 2014 OECD Model Income Tax Treaty]. The commentary continues that “[a]ll 
relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine the place of effective 
management.” Id. at 91. The “Observations on the Commentary” and the “Reservations on 
the Article” that follow this section of the Commentary make clear that different countries have 
different interpretations of the term “place of effective management.” See, e.g., id. at ¶ 26.3, at 
92 (France “considers . . . [that the term] will generally correspond to the place where the person 
or group of persons who exercises the most senior functions (for example a board of directors 
or management board) makes its decisions”); id. at ¶ 26.4, at 92 (Hungary will take into account 
“the place where the chief executive officer and other senior executives usually carry on their 
activities . . .”); id. at ¶ 28, at 92 (Japan and Korea “wish to use in their conventions the term 
‘head or main office’” rather than place of effective management).  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of “Managed and Controlled,” 63 TAX NOTES 
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these rules are just about as porous as the formal place of 
incorporation rule. Few officers or directors are upset at the prospect 
of holding the relatively infrequent board meetings in out-of-the-way 
locales to generate better tax results, particularly if those locations are 
warm and sunny. Given the ease of telecommuting and the like, not 
to mention the indeterminate definition of “company headquarters,” 
there is little indication that headquarters tests for residency are very 
effective at restricting residency choice.67 
Another recent suggestion is to determine residency by the 
nationality of the shareholders of the corporation.68 This is likely to be 
far harder than its proponents project, given the ease of creating and 
the difficulty of penetrating intermediary entities as holders of shares.69  
 
INT’L 667, 667 (2011) (explaining that the “place of effective management” determines 
residence under tax treaties based on the OECD model). 
 67. See Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm 
Headquarters?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 741, 743  (2010) (“[E]ven beyond traditional divisions of 
activities among countries, the location of the headquarters themselves has become increasingly 
scattered in recent years. . . . Indeed, it may be profitable for a firm to split headquarters 
functions across countries.”); Fleming et al., supra note 51, at 25 (noting that “the site of a 
corporation’s place of management can be indeterminate”; also noting that this test would 
“create an incentive for corporations to refrain from maintaining their headquarters in the 
United States”); Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in the 
Digital Age, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 719, 726 (2003) (discussing the complications today’s 
“digital environment” cause in determining “the place of central management”); David R. 
Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition: “Foreign” and “Domestic” Taxpayers, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. 
LAW. 239, 261–62 (2006) (discussing the malleability of, and uncertainty caused by, a place-of-
central-management test); Johannes Voget, Relocation of Headquarters and International 
Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1067, 1069 (2011) (noting that about six percent of multinationals 
moved their headquarters between countries between 1997 and 2007; linking movement to 
increases in residence taxation); Leslie Picker, Tyco Merger Will Shift Tax Liability Overseas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2016, at B1, B5 (describing how Tyco changed its headquarters several times 
to gain tax advantages). But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 66, at 667–68 (arguing for headquarters 
test for residency); Marian, supra note 65, at 1618 (same). 
 68. See Fleming et al., supra note 51, at 22–23 (describing operation of such a system). 
 69. FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. Law 111–147, 124 Stat. 71, 
97–117, codified at I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474, 6038D and scattered sections) requires foreign 
financial corporations to identify their U.S. account holders. The information gathered for 
FATCA purposes would not easily be translated into what is necessary to implement an 
ownership rule for non-financial corporations. Such corporations would have to obtain the 
FATCA U.S. ownership information from all of its institutional shareholders, in addition to 
information about the owners of shares held outside such institutions. Further, because of the 
effect of U.S. status on foreign shareholders of these foreign corporations, foreign corporations 
(and possibly foreign stock exchanges) would no doubt devise mechanisms for preventing the 
accumulation of “undesirable” levels of U.S. ownership—mechanisms which could make it 
difficult for U.S. investors to diversify their investments from an international standpoint. The 
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Further, it is likely to increase the number of situations of overlapping 
or dual residency, imposing costs on both taxpayers and 
tax authorities. 
Others have suggested tying residency to listing on securities 
exchanges; if a corporation is listed on a U.S. exchange, it ought to be 
taxed as a U.S. resident.70 This suggestion, too, could create a number 
of dual residence corporations, but it brings with it a more serious risk: 
given the tax dollars involved and the increasing globalization of the 
securities markets, the primary effect of such a rule may be to decrease 
the attractiveness of utilizing U.S. exchanges.71 At the very least, the 
possibility of such an outcome would, as a practical matter, make such 
a change in U.S. law politically impossible. 
The bottom line is clear. As the non-tax benefits of U.S. residency 
have declined, any tax disadvantages of maintaining such a residency 
become more salient and more pressing. These tax disadvantages 
abound. One of the most serious of those disadvantages relates not to 
the taxation (or not) of income earned abroad, but rather of income 
earned in the United States. As the next section lays out, much of the 
income earned by foreign taxpayers from U.S. sources is not taxed in 
the United States. The right to tax this income is all too often assigned 
by treaty to a taxpayer’s country of residence—and since a taxpayer 
can choose to be resident in a country that will not tax such income, 
such income is not taxed anywhere. 
II. THE UNDERTAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS AND FOREIGN-
OWNED BUSINESSES 
The United States claims the right to tax all income earned by 
foreigners from sources within the United States. Like most countries, 
though, the United States does not tax all income legally sourced 
within its borders. Instead, it divides U.S. sourced income into two 
categories: business income and investment income. Once the 
requisite minimum of business activity occurs within the United 
 
effects on the securities markets may well be profound, and there is no guarantee that the changes 
will be salubrious. 
 70. See Fleming et al., supra note 51, at 23 (suggesting listing on U.S. exchange as 
rebuttable presumption of residency). 
 71. See Davidoff, supra note 38, at 628 (stating recent declines in cross-listing may reflect 
“a viable market alternative . . . in the United States to raise capital outside the public listing 
markets” and “a decline in U.S. equity premiums”). 
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States,72 foreigners’ U.S. sourced business income becomes subject to 
U.S. tax under the rules applicable to U.S. residents and 
corporations.73 U.S. sourced investment income, by contrast, may be 
subject to tax at a flat rate on the gross amount by statute,74 but often 
escapes tax altogether as a result of tax treaty concessions. Tax 
planning for foreign investors involves ensuring that as much U.S. 
sourced income as possible falls within the category either of untaxed 
investment income or of business income earned by a taxpayer who 
fails the applicable business nexus test. And at present, many such 
planning opportunities are available, although the new section 385 
regulations75 are aimed at shutting some of them down.76 
For example, “earnings stripping transactions” are used to 
transmute taxable business income into untaxed investment income. 
An entity operating a U.S. business and generating U.S. source 
business income77 can siphon off much of that income to a related 
foreign entity which is not itself engaged in a U.S. business in the form 
of deductible interest78 or royalty payments.79 These deductions 
reduce the operating entity’s taxable income and thus its U.S. tax 
 
 72. Under statutory law, before income becomes taxable under the preceding sections, 
the foreigner’s U.S. activities have to rise to the level of a “trade or business.” See I.R.C. § 882(b) 
(2012). When the foreigner is a resident of a country with which the United States has a tax 
treaty, the nexus requirement is higher; the taxpayer must have a “permanent establishment” in 
the United States before its business income can be taxed. See United States Model Income Tax 
Convention of February 17, 2016, art. 7.1, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 U.S. Model 
Treaty]. This provision of the U.S. Model Treaty is identical to its counterpart in the OECD 
Model Treaty, see 2014 OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 66, art. 7.1, as well as the 
prior U.S. model treaty, see United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 
2006, art. 7.1, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801. 
pdf [hereinafter 2006 U.S. Model Treaty]. 
 73. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882 (2012). 
 74. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881. 
 75. See Final Section 385 Regulations, supra note 10. 
 76. See Treasury Fact Sheet II, supra note 8 (“[T]oday’s final regulations narrowly target 
problematic earnings stripping transactions . . . .”); Treasury Fact Sheet I, supra note 8 (same). 
 77. The operating entity could be domestic or foreign, and may be a partnership or 
a corporation. 
 78. Section 163(j)(4)(B)(ii)–(5)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code disallows a deduction 
for “excess” interest payments made to foreign related entities protected from the withholding 
tax by treaty. However, its definition of “excess” is quite circumscribed (and generous to 
taxpayers). See infra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 26, at 542–43 (analyzing 
opportunities for foreign companies to strip income out of U.S. affiliates through royalty and 
other supply chain transactions); see also Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 680–82 (same). 
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liability. Meanwhile, the foreign recipients of these payments generally 
escape U.S. withholding tax because, although interest and royalties 
are types of investment income that by statute are subject to a 
substantial withholding tax,80 that tax is reduced or eliminated in most 
U.S. tax treaties.81 
Interest and royalty arrangements traditionally have been the 
easiest of the earnings stripping mechanisms to implement, but they 
are far from the only ones that are employed by taxpayers.82 Any 
transactions effected between the operating entity and a foreign 
related entity can be used to similar effect.83 The operating entity can 
purchase products (or services) from related foreign entities for resale 
in the United States at prices which incorporate the value of 
 
 80. Interest paid to unrelated foreign recipients is excluded from withholding tax by 
statute. See I.R.C. § 871(h) (2012) (portfolio interest exemption for foreign individual 
recipients); I.R.C. § 881(c)(1) (portfolio interest exemption for foreign corporate recipients). 
However, interest paid to related foreign companies falls outside those statutory exemptions and 
thus, in the absence of treaty protection, would be subjected to a withholding tax equal to thirty 
percent of the amount transferred. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A), 881(a)(1). 
 81. See Tax Rates on Income Other than Personal Service Income Under Chapter 3, Internal 
Revenue Code, and Income Tax Treaties, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/international/Tax_Treaty_Table_1.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2016) (listing treaty withholding rates) [hereinafter I.R.S. Table 1]. In 2012, almost 
ninety percent of all U.S. source income paid to foreign persons was exempt from withholding 
tax. Scott Luttrell, Foreign Recipients of U.S. Income, 2012, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Winter 
2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-init-id1602.pdf. 
 82. See Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 681 (example 1); Wells, supra note 22, at 6–9 
(describing income stripping transactions utilizing interest, royalty, lease, and supply chain 
transactions); Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 26, at 540–45 (same). 
 83. Moreover, the foreign entity need not be related to the U.S. entity for these payments 
to have an untoward effect on the U.S. fisc. See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text 
(discussing effects of credit transactions involving unrelated parties). However, taxpayers tend 
to prefer transactions with related parties because no portion of the overall (tax or economic) 
gains have to be split with outsiders; in addition, related party transactions provide opportunities 
to exploit pricing uncertainties. Although section 482 allows the Internal Revenue Service to 
readjust the prices at which related parties transact to conform to “arm’s length standards,” its 
implementation is, to say the least, imperfect. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 21–22 (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (“A more recent study by Clausing indicated 
that the revenue loss from profit shifting may have been as high as $90 billion in 2008, although 
an alternative data set indicates profit shifting of $57 billion. . . . If rising proportional to 
revenue, the 2014 level would be $66 billion to $104 billion.” “Grubert has estimated that 
about half of income shifting was due to transfer pricing of intangibles and most of the remainder 
to shifting of debt.”); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING 110 (2010) 
(describing difficulties in applying rules to “unique intangible property”); Kleinbard, supra note 
18, at 733–37 (detailing flaws in application of arm’s length standards). 
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trademarks, patents, or other forms of intangible property for which a 
royalty could have been separately stated and charged. As long as the 
foreign provider avoids U.S. business status, its profits escape U.S. 
source taxation—and of course, the operating entity pays U.S. tax only 
on the difference between its resale price and its cost of acquiring the 
resold products. Alternatively, a foreign provider’s price can include a 
substantial payment for the “business risks” assumed by the foreign 
entity. As long as the related foreign entity receiving such payments 
falls short of satisfying the applicable business nexus test, such income 
falls outside the U.S. tax net.84 
These earnings stripping techniques are beneficial, of course, only 
if and to the extent the income diverted from the U.S. tax base does 
not end up included in the tax base of another high-tax jurisdiction. 
It is absolutely of no benefit to avoid a $350 U.S. tax obligation at the 
cost of paying $350 in taxes to France. Fortunately for taxpayers (and 
unfortunately for the U.S. fisc), foreign tax laws85—and the 
intersection between foreign and U.S. tax laws86—provide myriad 
opportunities for foreign MNEs—and often only foreign MNEs87—to 
 
 84. If the related foreign entity is directly or indirectly owned by a U.S. corporation, this 
income remains subject to U.S. taxation and indeed may become immediately taxable in the 
hands of its U.S. owner under the subpart F taxing regime. See I.R.C. §§ 951–52, 954, 957–58. 
The desire to escape the subpart F regime is a motivating factor for many inversion transactions. 
See Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 682 (“Avoiding the Subpart F rules in order to engage in 
U.S. earnings stripping is an important reason for corporate expatriations/inversions.”). 
 85. Though one might think that a treaty partner would want to collect the taxes awarded 
to it under a treaty arrangement, foreign countries have as little power to attract or retain 
“residents” as does the United States. Thus, they often compete for residents by foregoing 
residence-based taxing rights. The recent proliferation of “patent boxes”—which set 
exceptionally low rates of tax for royalty income generated by entities engaging in “substantial” 
research and development activities in the country—is an example of such competition. See Peter 
R. Merrill et al., Is It Time for the United States to Consider the Patent Box?, 134 TAX NOTES 
1665, 1665 (2012) (describing patent boxes and their prevalence). 
 86. For example, taxpayers may utilize elections made available under the “check-the-
box” regulations to create entities which are respected for U.S. tax purposes (and capable of 
being recipients of deducted and treaty-exempted payments of interest or royalty income) while 
being ignored for foreign tax purposes (so that the foreign jurisdiction fails to “see” the income 
such entities have received). There are a number of variations on this basic theme. See Talley, 
supra note 54, at 1668–71 (detailing the double Irish sandwich); Edward D. Kleinbard, Through 
a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income Planning, 139 TAX NOTES 1515, 1521–24 (2013) 
(detailing the tax effects of Starbucks’s internal structure). 
 87. The income of foreign entities directly or indirectly owned by U.S. shareholders may 
be included in the income of those shareholders under the subpart F regime in the year earned, 
see I.R.C. §§ 951–58, thus preventing the MNE from obtaining a tax advantage from the 
arrangement. Then again, the subpart F regime has enough holes in it that such an outcome is 
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escape that alternative tax. Entities have to be careful when choosing 
their residence country, but many countries have positioned 
themselves as attractive residence choices.88 Indeed, inversion 
transactions are all about making such a careful residence 
country choice. 
Is it any wonder that U.S. multinationals are rushing for the exits? 
Inversion transactions not only provide a way of escaping the reach of 
the subpart F regime and other U.S. rules for the taxation of foreign 
income, they also provide a way of escaping U.S. taxation of U.S. 
business income. Indeed, virtually all U.S. business income can be 
transmuted into “stateless” or “untaxed” income through earnings 
stripping transactions.89 Though one can argue whether it matters, 
from a non-tax perspective, whether the multinationals operating in 
the United States are foreign or domestic,90 the threat inversions pose 
to the corporate income tax system—and perhaps the individual 
income tax as well—is nothing short of existential. The question is 
what to do about it. 
The next part details the changes that have to be made, and the 
changes that could be made, to rectify the disparity in tax treatment 
 
not assured. See Kleinbard, supra note 86, at 1524–25 (examining Starbucks’s avoidance of 
that regime). 
 88. Although some countries maintain controlled foreign corporation regimes that are 
analogous to subpart F, other countries do not. See Brian J. Arnold, A Comparative Perspective 
on the U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, 65 TAX L. REV. 473, 496 (2012) (“Since 1972, 
however, twenty-seven countries have adopted CFC rules.”). Like the subpart F regime, 
however, foreign-controlled corporation regimes are far from perfect at ensuring that the 
residence country picks up the tax foregone at source—though some may be more effective than 
subpart F. See id. at 497 (“The CFC rules of most European countries are considerably less 
effective than subpart F (Germany is an exception in this regard).”). But see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
& Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 55) 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716125) (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (“It should be remembered 
that the other G20 have more effective CFC rules than we do, and those CFC rules already act 
as a de facto worldwide system with a minimum tax . . . .”). 
 89. See Kleinbard, supra note 86, at 1515 (“[I]f Starbucks can organize itself as a 
successful stateless income generator, any multinational company can.”). The regulations 
promulgated under section 385 are aimed at making such maneuvers more difficult. See Treasury 
Fact Sheet II, supra note 8 (“The new regulations restrict the ability of corporations to engage 
in earnings stripping . . . .”). For a more extended discussion of the effect of these regulations, 
see infra notes 121–31 and accompanying text. 
 90. Often nothing other than taxes are at stake; the inverting corporation may change 
neither the location of its business operations nor its headquarters. Indeed, it is possible that 
toughening tax rules would be counterproductive. The United States would not benefit, for 
example, from adopting a headquarters rule for corporate residence if doing so led a number of 
multinationals to move their headquarters from New York to Dublin. 
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between U.S. and foreign multinationals, at least as regards their U.S. 
source income. Whether such changes would be enough to prevent 
corporations from fleeing U.S. status is an open question; even were 
the tax on U.S. source income equalized, some corporations might 
still avoid U.S. status to reduce the worldwide tax liability imposed on 
their foreign income.91 Changing the rules for the taxation of U.S. 
income in the first instance would affect the amount of tax collected 
by the U.S. government from all taxpayers—inverted or not—more 
than it would affect corporate decisions about tax residence. And as 
the discussion makes clear, it is not even certain that the first end can 
be achieved. 
III. HOW TO INCREASE TAXATION AT SOURCE 
Although countries have the right to tax the worldwide income of 
their residents, they may only tax nonresidents on the portion of their 
income that is derived from sources within their borders. Thus the 
United States may tax the U.S. source income of a French 
corporation, but not the U.K. source income of that corporation, even 
if the French corporation also operates in the United States. At 
present, though, much of the U.S. sourced income of foreign and 
foreign-owned entities escapes the U.S. tax net.92 The question faced 
in this Part is what would be required to change that outcome and 
thereby bring the tax treatment of wholly domestic, foreign, and 
domestic but foreign-owned business operations in the United States 
into closer tax conformity with respect to their U.S. source income. 
One easy solution, which would engender perfect conformity, would 
be to eliminate the corporate income tax in its entirety. However, for 
 
 91. Because of the availability of tax credits, the U.S. tax on foreign earnings becomes a 
non-issue if such income has been taxed at source at a rate similar to the U.S. tax rate. At present, 
not only are U.S. statutory tax rates higher than that of most other countries, but U.S. MNEs 
have become masters at avoiding other countries’ source-based taxes. Inversions would be less 
popular if other countries also did a better job of taxing income at source. The BEPS project, see 
OECD, supra note 20, ostensibly is aimed at helping countries do just that, but it is too early to 
see whether it will fulfill that mission. 
 92. Almost all of the acknowledged U.S. source income paid to foreigners escapes the 
withholding tax. See Luttrell, supra note 81 (in 2012, almost 90% of all U.S. source income paid 
to foreign persons was exempt from withholding tax). In addition, as discussed infra Sections 
III.B & C, foreign multinationals may understate their U.S. source income by manipulating the 
prices they charge their U.S. entities for goods, services or intellectual property rights. The 
“foreign sourced income” of foreign companies is not (at least as a general rule) subject to tax 
in the United States. 
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purposes of this Article, I assume that the goal is to levy a positive rate 
of tax on the income of both entities. 
As the discussion in this Part explains, bringing U.S. sourced 
income earned by foreign entities within the U.S. tax net will not be 
easy. It will often require the United States to develop legally 
acceptable evasions of tax treaty provisions  which  cede taxing 
jurisdiction over such income to recipients’ residence countries. Many 
if not most of the current tax avoidance techniques are made possible 
by provisions in U.S. tax treaties reallocating taxing rights from source 
countries to residence countries. Though these treaty practices may 
once have made sense,93 they do great damage in a world in which 
taxpayers are free to establish residence in no- or low-tax countries, at 
least if one’s goal is to collect a corporate income tax.94 
The most direct route to achieving realistic reform in many cases 
would be to amend U.S. tax treaty policy and its existing treaties. 
However, that is easier said than done, both mechanically, politically, 
and practically. Treaties are bilateral instruments; the United States 
lacks the power of unilateral amendment. Bilateral renegotiation is a 
long and fraught process, with no guarantee of success. Political 
factors other than tax policy may further impede the process. The time 
horizon for such changes is quite long.95 Hence, although in some 
cases treaty changes provide the only option for effective change, this 
Article rarely considers them as the first option. 
A. Interest Deductions and Payments 
Although the distinction between “debt” and “equity” is one of 
the foundations of most (and certainly the U.S.) income tax systems, 
 
 93. Or not. These treaty policies grew out of the mercantilist economic model adopted 
by the victors of World War I, a model that presumed that “the country of residence should have 
the primary and residual right to collect tax on international business activity” because “the 
imperial countries were viewed as providing the capital and technology with which to produce 
income in the colonies.” Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 26, at 537. Even its 
framers, though, recognized that they “provided the implements to erode the tax base of 
[residence] countries . . . .” See id. 
 94. See Wells & Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy, supra note 26, at 34 (“To a significant 
extent, the governments that now pillory MNEs for creating homeless income were the framers 
of the mercantilist approach to international taxation that created the opportunity in the 
first place.”). 
 95. See Benshalom, supra note 26, at 704 (discussing treaty networks as “extremely 
difficult to negotiate and amend”); David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
455, 455–57 (1996) (describing clumsiness of treaty mechanisms). 
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it has always been problematic.96 Tax authorities themselves have had 
enormous difficulty distinguishing between debt and equity.97 Given 
the extremely low rates of return on “riskless” debt,98 it seems quite 
obvious that the overwhelming majority of the return on debt, like 
the return on equity, ultimately stems from the success of the business 
enterprise in which the funds have been invested, and thus should be 
treated for tax purposes in a manner similar to equity, which is subject 
to tax at both the corporate and shareholder level in the United States. 
While the rules for sourcing interest income are similar to those for 
sourcing business income,99 for the most part, the United States does 
not tax U.S. source interest income received by a foreign taxpayer 
unless that taxpayer derives such interest income in the context of that 
taxpayer’s U.S. business operations. If a U.S. business (be it foreign 
or domestic) pays interest to a foreign entity that is not itself engaged 
in a U.S. business activity, the interest generally escapes U.S. 
tax altogether.100 
 
 96. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., REP. ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS 39–60 (1992) (detailing inefficiencies created by differential taxation 
of corporate income and debt and alternate taxing mechanisms); ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AM. 
LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 42 (1993). 
 97. Section 385, granting Treasury the power to issue regulations differentiating between 
debt and equity, was enacted in 1969. Treasury enacted a first set of regulations in 1980, but 
these were so heavily criticized that their effective date was repeatedly postponed. A similar fate 
befell the 1981 amendments to those regulations. Eventually, all versions of the regulation were 
“withdrawn . . . and the project abandoned.” David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and 
Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1638 n.49 (1999) (describing the saga of 
these regulations as “lamentable”). The regulations adopted on October 14, 2016, see Final 
Section 385 Regulations, supra note 10, are the first attempt since then to utilize this statutorily 
granted power. 
 98. “Riskless debt” is the closest approximation to a pure “time value of money” return 
on capital investment. At present, investors are willing to accept negative returns on Swiss, 
German, and Dutch government bonds. See Buttonwood, The crazy world of credit: Where 
negative yields and worries about default coincide, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 2016, at 62. 
 99. Interest income is sourced under statutory law at the residence of the debtor, I.R.C. 
§ 861(a)(1)(A) (2012), or in the United States if deducted as an expense of a U.S. business, 
I.R.C. § 884(f)(1). 
 100. If the foreign entity is a subsidiary of a U.S. MNE, however, the interest income may 
be included in the income of its U.S. shareholder(s) under the subpart F regime. Fleming et al., 
supra note 34, at 687 n.44. 
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Although, by statute, much U.S. sourced interest income paid to 
related foreigners not engaged in U.S. trades or businesses101 is subject 
to a flat rate withholding tax,102 the practice of using tax treaties to 
eliminate source country taxation of interest income was established 
quite early on.103 Its elimination remains a feature of the most recent 
U.S. Model Income Tax Convention.104 Treaties’ removal of the 
withholding tax obligation is subject to a “limitation of benefits” 
provision, which ensures that the entity receiving the benefit is not a 
mere conduit for another, non-treaty protected entity.105 But 
limitation of benefits provisions do not guarantee that the foreign 
recipient of the interest will pay residence country tax comparable to 
the foregone U.S. source tax. Not only has the United States entered 
into a number of treaties with low-tax countries, but the treaty limits 
themselves have proven to be relatively ineffective due to “high 
negotiation costs, complexity, and enormous information-finding and 
litigation costs not available to tax authorities.”106 As a result, the 
 
 101. Sections 871(h) and 881(c) of the Internal Revenue Code call off this tax for certain 
“portfolio” interest income, that is, interest income received by foreign persons or entities 
unrelated to the U.S. payor. 
 102. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1). 
 103. See Benshalom, supra note 26, at 660 (pointing to the 1945 tax convention with the 
U.K. as the “constitutive moment[]” in the history of this treaty policy). 
 104. See 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 11.1 (“Interest arising in a 
Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State shall be 
taxable only in that other Contracting State.”). This model treaty cuts back on expatriated 
entities’ use of the exemption. Article 11.2(d) calls off the exemption for “interest paid by an 
expatriated entity” and received by a related party for ten years following that expatriation. It 
also treats the interest paid by a permanent establishment of a corporation resident in the treaty 
partner to its home office as taxable business profits. See id. at art. 11.5. However, it does not 
treat interest paid to a related corporate entity as business profits. And, of course, these new 
limiting terms apply only to entities resident in countries which have entered into treaties 
containing them; the former model (issued in 2006) did not have an analogous rule. See 2006 
U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 11. 
 105. See 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 22; 2006 U.S. Model Treaty, supra 
note 72, at art. 22. 
 106. Benshalom, supra note 26, at 683. Moreover, the limitation-of-benefits provisions 
found in existing tax treaties are far from uniform, with some more effective than others. See 
Marie Sapirie, Model Treaty Highlights Treasury’s New International Policies, 151 TAX NOTES 
148, 149 (2016) (“[E]ach model treaty since 1996 has changed LOB rules significantly . . . . 
The result is that no two LOB provisions in actual treaties look alike . . . .”). The relative 
ineffectiveness of these provisions is one reason why “treaty abuse, and in particular treaty 
shopping” was identified as “one of the most important sources of BEPS concerns.” OECD, 
PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
ACTION 6: 2015 FINAL REPORT, at 9 (OECD Publishing Paris) (2015), http://www.oecd-
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current U.S. tax treaty network affords foreign MNEs substantial 
opportunities and incentives to use interest deductions to strip out the 
earnings of business operations conducted in the United States.107 
For example, suppose U.S. Acme, a company owned by Irish 
Acme, earns $10 million before interest expenses are taken into 
account by manufacturing and selling widgets. Irish Acme, however, 
had loaned U.S. Acme $150 million to build its widget factory, and 
the interest payments on that loan are $8 million per year. Those 
interest payments reduce U.S. Acme’s taxable income from $10 
million to $2 million, and its corporate tax obligation from $3.5 
million to $700,000. Under the terms of the U.S.-Ireland Tax Treaty, 
 
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315331e.pdf?expires=1475619379&id=id&accname=gues
t&checksum=0F889782A71EF9323972F99640717811. 
 107. Interest payments have been one of the largest components of current earnings 
stripping transactions by inverted U.S. companies. See Gravelle, supra note 83, at 22 (“Grubert 
has estimated that about half of income shifting was due to transfer pricing of intangibles and 
most of the remainder to shifting of debt”). It is unclear how often “true” foreign MNEs use 
interest-based earnings stripping techniques. In 2007, Treasury, at the explicit behest of 
Congress, carried out a study on the use of earnings stripping transactions by foreign-controlled 
domestic corporations, and “did not find conclusive evidence of earnings stripping from foreign-
controlled domestic corporations that had not inverted.”  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EARNINGS 
STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 4 (2007), https://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Earnings-Stripping-Transfer-Pri
cing-2007.pdf. This finding was echoed in a more recent discussion of the issue by the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, BACKGROUND, SUMMARY, AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF OECD/G20 BASE EROSISON AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 35 (2015) 
(“Figure 2 does not offer conclusive evidence that FCDCs are, or are not, engaged in earnings 
stripping . . . .”). However, the OECD’s BEPS studies revealed strong evidence of global BEPS 
behavior. OECD, MEASURING AND MONITORING: BEPS ACTION 11, at 15–16 (2015) (listing 
“[s]ix indicators of BEPS activity” including “[t]he profit rates of MNE affiliates located in 
lower-tax countries are higher than their group’s average worldwide profit rate” and “[t]he 
effective tax rates paid by large MNE entities are estimated to be 4 to 8 ½ percentage points 
lower than similar enterprises with domestic-only operations”). As one commentator noted, “the 
U.S. nonfinding of earnings stripping [by foreign multinationals] . . . defies intuition, [and] runs 
against the general results from almost everywhere . . . .” Patrick Driessen, Do Foreign 
Corporations Really Not Strip the U.S. Tax Base?, 150 TAX NOTES 927, 929 (2016); see also 
Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 691 (“Moreover, the aggressive behavior of corporations in 
using other tactics to shift profits out of the U.S. tax base ipso facto suggests that earnings 
stripping is surely being employed for the same purpose in scenarios other than corporate 
inversions even if the confirming data has not yet been collected.”). Driessen suggests that the 
Treasury study may have missed the base erosion problems created by foreign corporations 
because they tend to strip income out of the United States through transfer pricing schemes 
rather than interest deductions. See Driessen, supra, at 929 n.18. Others have suggested that 
Treasury and Congress have looked the other way for fear of scaring away foreign investors. See 
Martin A. Sullivan, Is Earnings Stripping Our Inbound Investment Incentive?, 151 TAX  NOTES 
259, 259 (“In contrast to the easy politics of attacking inversions, the politics of raising taxes on 
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign multinationals is a minefield.”). 
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no U.S. tax is imposed on the interest payment made to Irish Acme.108 
Though Irish Acme has to pay tax on its interest income in Ireland, 
Irish corporate tax rates are only 12.5%,109 so its Irish tax obligation 
amounts to a mere $1 million. The loan arrangement thus reduces the 
Acmes’ combined tax obligation from around $3.5 million110 to $1.7 
million, or even less if the taxpayer finds a way to reduce the Irish 
residence tax.111 
Several countries, including the United States, attempt to 
ameliorate the adverse effects of these treaty provisions by imposing 
restrictions on the deductibility of interest payments.112 When 
effective, such deduction limitations increase the income of—and the 
taxes paid by—entities making interest payments. Those entities end 
up paying a source tax at the entity level on interest that, in the absence 
 
 108. See CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOV’T OF THE U.S. AND THE GOV’T OF IRELAND 
FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAX’N AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH 
RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAP. GAINS, at art. 11.1 (1998), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/ireland.pdf (“Interest arising in a Contracting State and 
beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed only in that other 
State.”). The only exception to this rule provided in the treaty is for interest paid “by reason of 
a special relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner . . . [which] exceeds the 
amount which would have been agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial owner in the 
absence of such a relationship.” Id. at art. 11.5. 
 109. See DELOITTE, CORPORATE TAX RATES 2016 (updated Mar. 2016), https://www2. 
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates. 
pdf (“Standard corporation tax rate on trading income is 12.5%.”). 
 110. The tax obligation would actually be a bit higher because most U.S. tax treaties 
impose a small withholding tax on dividend payments, even those made to controlling 
shareholders. See I.R.S. Table 1, supra note 81. 
 111. Historically, most taxpayers did find ways to reduce the Irish tax obligation from 
12.5% to around 2%. See Kleinbard, supra note 18, at 706–13 (describing the “Double Irish 
Dutch Sandwich”). Although Ireland claims to have eliminated this particular tax device, many 
are skeptical. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Ireland Declares ‘Double Irish’ Tax Scheme Dead, FORBES 
(Oct. 15, 2014, 08:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/10/15/
ireland-declares-double-irish-tax-scheme-dead/#3a6931ee1527 (“Under the new rules, 
companies not already operating in the country may not pursue the ‘Double Irish’ scheme as of 
January 2015; those already engaging in the scheme have a five year window to wind down”; 
“the 2% tax rate paid by Apple may become a thing of the past”). Indeed, now that the EU 
Commission has determined that this taxing regime constituted “state aid” impermissible under 
the terms of the EU governing treaty, Apple and other users may be forced to repay some of 
their tax savings to the Irish government. See Press Release, European Commission, Statement 
by Commissioner Vestager on state aid decision that Ireland’s tax benefits for Apple were illegal 
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2926_en.htm. 
 112. The United States’ first limitation, contained in § 163(j) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, was enacted in 1989. The newly adopted section 385 regulations, see supra note 10, are 
vastly more inclusive and stringent. See infra text accompanying notes 122–35 (describing reach 
of section 385 regulations). 
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of the deduction disallowance, would have been received by a treaty 
country resident free of source tax under the terms of the applicable 
tax treaty.113 For example, in the U.S. Acme-Irish Acme example 
above, if the United States limited U.S. Acme’s interest deduction to 
$4 million (rather than the claimed $8 million), U.S. Acme’s taxable 
income would be $6 million (rather than $2 million) and its U.S. tax 
obligation would increase from $700,000 to $2,100,000. What 
remained of the $4 million in disallowed interest (after payment of the 
U.S. tax) could still be distributed to Irish Acme; whether this 
distribution would be free of additional U.S. source tax imposed on 
the recipient (but collected in the form of a withholding tax from U.S. 
Acme, the payor) would depend on whether this payment retains its 
characterization as an “interest” payment for treaty purposes (so that 
no additional source tax is imposed) or whether it is treated as a 
dividend, a distribution of U.S. Acme’s after-tax profits. Although tax 
treaties substantially reduce the source taxation of dividend payments, 
they often leave a small residual source tax in place, even when the 
dividend payment is being made to a related foreign corporation.114 As 
a technical matter, however, countries with these limitations115 have 
successfully maintained the fiction that they do not constitute treaty 
overrides by arguing that they target only non-arm’s-length debt or 
interest amounts. This is certainly how the United States has 
rationalized its own limitations on related party debt and interest 
 
 113. See Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury: The “Enhancement” of § 163(j) and the Tax 
Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 289 (1994) (describing 
§ 163(j) as a treaty override). 
 114. Interestingly, most tax treaties retain some vestige of the withholding tax for dividends 
paid to residents of the treaty partner, despite the fact that dividends typically (although not 
always) are paid out of funds that have already been subjected to one level of source country tax. 
See I.R.S. Table 1, supra note 81 (listing treaty withholding rates). This withholding tax may be 
eliminated, however, if the treaty country recipient is a tax-exempt entity such as a charity. 
 115. Many countries already have such limitations. See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, TAX 
DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE INTEREST EXPENSE § 2 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/
government/consultations/tax-deductibility-of-corporate-interest-expense/tax-deductibility-
of-corporate-interest-expense-consultation (Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain “already 
have rules that provide a structural restriction on tax relief for interest expense”; the UK has a 
“worldwide debt cap”). More will follow if countries adopt the recommendations promulgated 
by the BEPS project.  See OECD, LIMITING BASE EROSION INVOLVING INTEREST 
DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER FINANCIAL PAYMENTS, ACTION 4: 2015 FINAL REPORT 11 (2015) 
(“The recommended approach is based on a fixed ratio rule which limits an entity’s net 
deductions for interest and payments economically equivalent to interest to a percentage of its 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). As a minimum this 
should apply to entities in multinational groups.”). 
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deductions.116 Section 163(j), for example, disallows deductions only 
for interest payments defined in the statute as “excess 
interest expense.”117 
Section 163(j), however, has been widely regarded as under-
inclusive.118 For instance, although it could reduce the allowable 
interest deduction in the U.S. Acme-Irish Acme example above from 
$8 million to $5 million, it would only do so if U.S. Acme had a debt-
to-equity ratio in excess of 1.5 to 1. Numerous amendments and 
alternative approaches have been proposed to broaden and rationalize 
its reach.119 
 
 116. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under Section 385, supra note 10, at 20914 
(describing the focus of the regulations as “excessive indebtedness between . . . related parties”); 
Benshalom, supra note 26, at 699 (differentiating “limiting abusive affiliated transactions and 
the overriding of treaty obligations”); Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 706–07 (describing § 
163(j)’s conformity with treaty obligations). Further, Treasury has pointed out that while 
treaties may exempt interest payments from source country taxation, the source country’s 
domestic law determines whether a particular payment constitutes interest. See Final Section 385 
Regulations, supra note 10, at 72,888 (“[T]he arm’s length . . . principle would not apply to 
the classification in the first instance of whether an instrument is debt or equity, which is a 
determination made under the relevant domestic law of the jurisdiction that is applying the 
treaty.”). Of course, given the near ubiquity of “non-discrimination” clauses in its tax treaties, 
U.S. rules for distinguishing between debt and equity cannot impose greater burdens on foreign 
taxpayers than are imposed on its own citizens or residents “in the same circumstances.” See 
Fleming et al, supra note 34, at 703 (describing treaty nondiscrimination rule). However, just 
as Congress extended section 163(j) to certain tax exempt U.S. payors to satisfy this rule, 
Treasury extended the reach of the section 385 regulations to instruments and payments made 
between related domestic corporations that do not file on a consolidated basis. See Final Section 
385 Regulations, supra note 10, at 72,889 (arguing that the regulations do not “raise 
discrimination concerns” because “the recharacterization does not depend on whether the 
lender is a U.S. or foreign person, but on whether the lender files (or is required to file) a 
consolidated return with the issuer”). Given that most related domestic corporations must file 
consolidated returns, and most of the remainder find it beneficial to do so, while related domestic 
and foreign corporations cannot file consolidated returns, this is a distinction without any 
real difference. 
 117. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A) (2012) (disallowing deduction for “disqualified interest” 
up to the amount of the corporation’s “excess interest expense”). “Disqualified interest” is 
interest paid to a related party that is not subject to U.S. tax. I.R.C. § 163(j)(3). Only 
corporations with a debt to equity ratio in excess of 1.5 to 1 can have an “excess interest 
expense,” I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A); an interest expense becomes “excess” when it exceeds fifty 
percent of the corporation’s “adjusted taxable income . . . plus any excess limitation 
carryforward.” I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(B)(i)(II). 
 118. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 26, at 691–93 (earnings-stripping provision’s 
“limited scope”); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Income Stripping by Interest Deductions, 141 TAX 
NOTES 971, 978 (2013) (same); Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 727 (“Section 163(j) is under-
inclusive in several respects . . . .”). 
 119. See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 729–33 (suggesting “strengthening” at the 
“margins” but admitting that even if amended “it is difficult to see how § 163(j) . . . will have 
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One oft-made suggestion is simply to disallow all deductions for 
interest paid with respect to related party debt, regardless of 
amount.120 There is good reason to be suspicious of such related party 
loan transactions. The congruence of interest between debtor and 
creditor entities leaves open the possibility that both the price and 
amount of debt provided may reflect tax considerations rather than 
any underlying economic reality.121 And certainly it is more attractive 
to load up a subsidiary with debt and its accompanying obligations to 
make interest payments if those payments remain in the corporate 
group. However, to comply with the nondiscrimination rules found 
in many of our existing tax treaties, such a disallowance would have to 
apply across the board, to interest payments made to related foreign 
and domestic entities.122 Few thought that Congress or Treasury 
would go that far. 
Yet that is close to what Treasury has done in its newly adopted 
section 385 regulations. In addition to imposing stringent 
documentation requirements on related party debt,123 the regulations 
will treat “purported debt” as equity when issued to a member of the 
debtor’s “expanded group”124 in the context of a distribution—
 
any significant role to play in developing a comprehensive and coherent approach to dealing 
with earnings stripping”); Kleinbard, supra note 15, at 1068 (advocating lowering ceiling on 
deductions applicable to all foreign corporations, not just inverted ones); Martin A. Sullivan, The 
Many Ways to Limit Earnings Stripping, 144 TAX NOTES 377 (2014) (describing the ten 
proposals offered to Congress since 2002 for strengthening § 163(j)). 
 120. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 88, at 35 (“We strongly urge that the bottom 
line of international tax law reform is that interest deductions may not be greater in aggregate 
than each corporate group’s consolidated interest costs to third parties.”); Fleming et al., supra 
note 34, at 700–01 (advocating disallowance of deductions for payments to related parties except 
to the extent they can be traced to third party expenditures made on its behalf by the related 
party); Lee A. Sheppard, BEPS Action 4: Interest Deduction Restrictions, 149 TAX NOTES 190, 
190 (2015). 
 121. See Benshalom, supra note 26, at 706 (“MNEs are able to skew, contractually, the 
risks from the income and deductions associated with the holdings of their financial assets 
between their various subsidiaries.”); Roin, supra note 113, at 291 (same). 
 122. See Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 707 (“Fortunately, these [treaty] difficulties can 
be overcome by adopting a U.S. rule that prohibits deductions for payments . . . to all related 
parties, both domestic and foreign.”). 
 123. See Final Section 385 Regulations, supra note 10, § 1.385-2 (documentation 
requirements). The final documentation rules are somewhat less stringent than those contained 
in the proposed regulations. See id. at 72,872–73 (describing changes in documentation 
standards in final regulations in response to comments). 
 124. Id. § 1.385-1(c)(4) (defining “expanded group”). Of course, as explained supra note 
116, very few if any domestic-to-domestic transactions will be affected because of the exclusion 
of transactions occurring between taxpayers filing consolidated returns. 
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including a redemption—, in exchange for affiliate stock, pursuant to 
an internal reorganization, or for the purpose of funding a distribution 
or an acquisition.125 
Of course, even a complete elimination of deductions for related 
party interest may fail to significantly increase U.S. tax revenues. U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign MNEs (including “legitimately”126 inverted 
MNEs) may substitute unrelated party debt for related party debt, just 
as they did to avoid the reach of section 163(j);127 fully domestic 
companies can do the same. Interest payments made to unrelated 
foreign entities and individuals would remain tax-favored, that is, 
deductible against U.S. source business income and exempt from 
taxation at source. Although this would prevent companies from 
“juicing up” the debt obligations of their U.S. operations with related 
party loans, the U.S. treasury may collect far less revenue than they 
expect from this change in rules, as it is unclear how much of the 
related party debt is “overstated.”128 
But would U.S. businesses replace related party debt with debt 
provided by unrelated foreign creditors? Ultimately, it will depend on 
whether the favorable tax treatment of interest payable to unrelated 
foreign lenders is passed through to U.S. customers in the form of 
lower interest rates. If so, there is no reason to believe that taxpayers 
will pass up such cost savings. Thirty years ago, Congress believed that 
the favorable tax treatment of foreign lenders was passed through to 
their customers. That belief provided the rationale for Congress’s 
removal of the statutory withholding tax on “portfolio” interest. 
 
 125. Id. § 1.385-3(b); id. at 72,889 (describing minimal changes from 
proposed regulations). 
 126. In other words, those former U.S. MNEs that manage to avoid the reach of section 
7874 and become foreign MNEs. 
 127. Alternatively, the foreign multinational may “check-the-box” for the U.S. and other 
entities, leading to a formulaic allocation to the U.S. operations of the interest expenses of the 
larger operation. 
 128. Debt may be overstated either in terms of principal amount (the total amount of loans 
borne by the entity in excess of its economic carrying capacity) or its interest rate (the debtor 
would have been able to obtain funds on better terms from an outside lender). To the extent 
the interest disallowance merely disallowed overstated interest, the disallowance would be in 
perfect accord with United States’ rights and responsibilities under its treaty arrangements; all 
treaties allow a state to recalculate the income of an entity which has been distorted by 
“conditions [which] are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or 
financial relations that differ from those that would be made between independent 
enterprises . . . .” 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 9.1.  
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Congress wanted the cost savings for its own debt.129 It also wanted 
to ensure that U.S. businesses did not pay higher costs of capital than 
their foreign competitors.130 Congress may have been deluded then; it 
may be that facts on the ground have changed.131 But if Congress was 
even partially right in its analysis, the revenue implications of the 
proposed section 385 regulations may be disappointing. 
Both the revenue and the policy impact of those regulations may 
be particularly disappointing because the exceptions132 to the 
treatment of related party debt as equity include money advanced to 
allow the debtor to make “new” investments in U.S. assets.133 This 
exception may leave section 163(j) as the only impediment to tax 
planning in the U.S. Acme-Irish Acme scenario detailed in this 
subsection, and any other transaction in which a foreign corporation 
 
 129. As I wrote many years ago, this rationale was “questionable” given that the 
government’s interest savings would be counterbalanced by revenue losses; it would only make 
financial sense in the very unlikely event that lenders reduced their interest rates by an amount 
greater than the reduction in their U.S. tax liabilities. See Roin, supra note 113, at 279 n.40. 
 130. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 391–92 (1984) 
(explaining the importance of “direct,” “tax-free access to the Eurobond market”). 
 131. Exemption from source taxation is not advantageous if it is offset by a higher residence 
country tax. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89. It was never clear how much of the tax-
favored treatment of investors in the Eurobond market—and thus their ability to offer lower 
pre-tax interest rates—stemmed from the self-help behavior of those investors in failing to report 
such income to their home jurisdictions. See Roin, supra note 113, at 284 n.61 (discussing the 
ubiquity of anonymity on the Eurobond market). To the extent FATCA and the OECD’s 
implementation of its common reporting standard (“CRS”) are successful at removing this 
anonymity and enforcing residence country taxation, some of this behavior—and the associated 
benefits to debtors—may simply disappear. See William Hoke, Reporting Rule Might Deflect Some 
Criticism of U.S. as Tax Haven, 150 TAX NOTES 528, 528 (2016) (describing the interplay 
between the two regimes). However, there is no assurance of their success. See Financial 
transparency: The biggest loophole of all, ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 2016, at 51, 52 (“[The CRS] was 
drafted in a rush, and one expert thinks it would fail to catch 80% of tax-dodging.”). 
 132. The proposed regulations contain de minimis rules; they also exempt domestic 
consolidated groups that file a single consolidated tax return since intercompany debt has no tax 
significance for such groups. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under Section 385, supra note 
10, at 72,929 (“[C]oncerns addressed in the proposed regulations generally are not present 
when the issuer’s deduction for interest expense and the holder’s corresponding interest income 
offset on the group’s consolidated federal income tax return.”). 
 133. See Treasury Fact Sheet I, supra note 8 (“The proposed regulations generally do not 
apply to related-party debt that is incurred to fund actual business investment, such as building 
or equipping a factory.”); Final Section 385 Regulations, supra note 10, at 72,882 (“The final 
and temporary regulations are intended to address debt instruments that do not finance new 
investment in operations of the borrower.”). This exception has led some to wonder “to what 
extent these highly complex regulations would hurt multinationals that haven’t inverted.” 
Sullivan, supra note 107, at 259. 
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advances money to a related U.S. corporation to purchase U.S. assets 
from an unrelated company. Foreign multinationals thus may 
continue to have both the financial incentive and the legal means to 
strip from the U.S. tax base earnings gleaned from new investments. 
As a result, U.S. entities planning on increasing their U.S. operations 
continue to have an incentive to invert (as long as they can do so in a 
way that avoids triggering section 7874) and founders of new 
businesses have an incentive to establish them as foreign, rather than 
domestic, entities. In short, this exemption from the coverage of the 
proposed regulations leaves earnings stripping as a tax incentive for 
new investment, a decision that may come back to haunt Treasury.134 
Although the new regulations require that purported debt 
instruments be treated as debt for tax purposes only if the purported 
debtor has the capacity to repay the debt,135 there is no requirement 
that such debt actually be repaid. Indeed, the regulations seem to 
foresee interest-only debt that is payable on demand—demand which 
may never be made.136 
An alternative (and simpler) approach would involve applying an 
across-the-board limitation on interest deductions for related party 
debt, regardless of the use of the funds. The Germans already have 
such a rule, and such a limitation is “one of the most important 
recommendations in the OECD’s BEPS report.”137 The amount of 
revenue raised would depend on the percentage of income cap as well 
as the extent to which a taxpayer substitutes unrelated party debt for 
 
 134. See Sullivan, supra note 107, at 262 (“Even if a case could be made that inbound 
investment deserves its own targeted tax benefit, earnings stripping is clearly an outlandish 
delivery mechanism.”). 
 135. See Final Section 385 Regulations, supra note 10, at 72,943 (“[T]axpayers must be 
able to provide such things as: Evidence of an unconditional and binding obligation to make 
interest and principal payments on certain fixed dates; that the holder of the loan has the rights 
of a creditor . . . ; a reasonable expectation of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan; and 
evidence of conduct consistent with a debtor-creditor relationship.”); Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking Under Section 385, supra note 10, at 20932 (“There must be written 
documentation prepared containing information establishing that . . . the issuer’s financial 
position supported a reasonable expectation that the issuer intended to, and would be able to, 
meet its obligations pursuant to the terms of the applicable instrument.”). 
 136. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under Section 385, supra note 10, at 20932 
(“There must be written documentation . . . establishing that the issuer has entered into an 
unconditional and legally binding obligation to pay a sum certain on demand or at one or more 
fixed dates.”) (emphasis added). However, it may be difficult under the regulations for the 
debtor to pay dividends prior to repaying outstanding debt principal. 
 137. Ryan Finley, Expect BEPS to Affect Private Equity Deals, Panel Says, 150 TAX NOTES 
185, 185 (describing “the action 4 report’s fixed-ratio rule”). 
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related party debt. The BEPS Action Plan suggests a cap of between 
ten and thirty percent138 of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (“EBITDA”). It suggests “supplementing” this 
fixed cap with a “worldwide group ratio rule which allows an entity to 
exceed this limit”139 to deal with special cases such as financial 
intermediaries. Many regard the particulars of the BEPS proposal as 
unduly taxpayer friendly, criticizing in particular the allowance of a 
thirty percent cap and its failure to limit total intragroup debt by the 
amount of outside debt.140  
The BEPS proposal, of course, is just that. Its drafters hope that 
participating governments will enact laws and negotiate treaties 
consistent with its recommendations of best practices.141 But standing 
on its own, it has no legal effect.142 Although a deduction cap 
applicable only to multinational entities would appear to violate the 
nondiscrimination rules found in many current U.S. tax treaties,143 the 
United States could argue that the need to conform to BEPS overrides 
any conflicting treaty obligation. Whether that argument will succeed 
in placating its treaty partners, however, is uncertain. Alternatively, 
given that both treaty partners may be under some pressure to adhere 
to the BEPS recommendations, they may be willing to agree on a 
treaty protocol specifically authorizing such legislation. Such 
protocols, however, would have to comply with the procedures 
applicable to treaty ratification, hindering speedy adoption.144   
 
 138. OECD, supra note 115, at 11 (“[T]he recommended approach includes a corridor of 
possible ratios of between 10% and 30%,” which “[a]s a minimum . . . should apply to entities 
in multinational groups.”). Current U.S. law, embodied in section 163(j), contains a 50% cap. 
See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012). 
 139. OECD, supra note 115, at 11. 
 140. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 88, at 34 (“Such a recommendation is not as 
powerful and strong as the audience anticipated.”); Sheppard, supra note 120, at 191 (“There 
is a broad view that the German level of 30 percent is too high . . . so that intragroup debt does 
not reflect, and often exceeds, outside debt.”). 
 141. See OECD, supra note 115, at 3 (“OECD and G20 countries have also agreed to 
continue to work together to ensure a consistent and co-ordinated implementation of the BEPS 
recommendations.”). 
 142. See id. (“The BEPS package is designed to be implemented via changes in domestic 
law and practices, and via treaty provisions . . . .”). 
 143. To conform to such U.S. treaty obligations, the cap would have to apply to interest 
payments made to foreign and domestic residents. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 144. See STAFFS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 
TAX TREATIES: STEPS IN THE NEGOT. AND RATIFICATION OF TAX TREATIES AND STATUS OF 
PROPOSED TAX TREATIES 1 (1979) (outlining the steps and procedures for the negotiation and 
ratification of “[t]ax treaties (and protocols to existing tax treaties)”). 
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Adopting a cap on related party interest deductions would 
decrease, but not eliminate, the financial incentive for U.S. 
corporations to engage in inversion transactions. Both U.S. and 
foreign multinationals would have to live with the same cap. However, 
only foreign multinationals would be able to derive the tax benefits 
associated with making those payments that survived the cap to 
related, low-tax foreign entities.145 
It is unclear how much revenue would be raised by enacting such 
a cap. Revenue would depend on the height and definition of the cap, 
as well as the extent to which related party debt was replaced with 
unrelated party, foreign debt, as discussed in this subsection. 
Moreover, if the United States adopts a cap that is significantly less 
generous than that of its competitor nations, it might find business 
operations locating abroad to qualify for what is, effectively, a lower 
tax rate. Such a result would be altogether worse than a “pure” 
inversion transaction, since the end result would be a loss of economic 
base as well as tax revenues. 
Alternatively, the United States could impose restrictions on 
taxpayers’ ability to fund the U.S. portions of their MNEs with higher 
levels of debt than the foreign portions of those MNEs.146 The United 
States currently applies such a rule to the U.S. portions of U.S. 
MNEs,147 and President Obama’s 2015,148 2016,149 and 2017150 
 
 145. If it remained part of a U.S. MNE, the benefit of the low rates likely would be lost 
due to the application of subpart F. See I.R.C. §§ 951–62 (2012). Thus, the financial incentives 
to engage in an inversion transaction would be reduced but not eliminated. 
 146. This amounts to adopting the “supplemental” BEPS rule without the percentage cap. 
 147. I.R.C. § 864(f). 
 148. See Sullivan, supra note 107, at 260 (“In its fiscal 2015 budget, released in March 
2014, the administration dropped the proposal to expand section 163(j) . . . that had been part 
of every presidential budget since 2008. In its place was an entirely new proposal to limit interest 
deductions for all foreign-parented multinationals.”). 
 149. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 10–12 (2015) (discussing how the proposal would 
limit the interest deduction of any member of a group of companies filing a consolidated financial 
statement to the sum of the member’s interest income and the proportion of the group’s 
worldwide net interest expense equal to the member’s proportion of the group’s worldwide 
earnings). This is not quite the same as the rule for U.S. MNEs, which looks to the proportion 
of U.S. assets to worldwide assets, rather than assets to earnings. The rule for U.S. MNEs accords 
better with the underlying fungibility of money theory, but it is much more difficult to determine 
asset value than EBITDA. 
 150. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 2–4 (2016) (discussing how the proposal would limit 
the interest deduction of any member of a group of companies filing a consolidated financial 
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Budget Proposals include recommendations for the extension of this 
rule to foreign owned entities. 
As has been amply demonstrated by another scholar,151 most 
proportionality rules can be gamed by taxpayers. Although some of 
the opportunities for taxpayer avoidance may be correctable,152 even 
the best proportionality rule would not remove the tax advantages 
accorded foreign creditors for debt that continues to be respected as 
debt. As a result, restrictions on disproportionate debt would not 
necessarily increase U.S. tax revenues, even assuming no change in the 
amount of business activity carried out in the United States. U.S. tax 
revenues will only increase if the total amount of interest deducted 
and paid to exempt foreign creditors declines—and that will depend 
not just on the current extent of disproportionate debt levels, but on 
the ease of development of alternative avoidance techniques. 
In sum, none of these proposals completely eliminate the tax 
preference for U.S. businesses to take on foreign debt, nor do they 
eliminate the economic incentives for expatriating U.S. 
multinationals. At best, each of the proposals reduces the demand for 
debt from low-taxed, related foreign entities; none remove the tax 
advantages of foreign status (elimination of the withholding tax at 
source coupled with reduced tax in the country of residence) that 
accrue to foreign creditors for debt that remains deductible. Inversion 
transactions would remain desirable as a method of protecting the tax 
advantaged status of any remaining related party interest income 
because subpart F, which might tax such income in the hands of 
related U.S. shareholders, applies only when the creditor entity is 
owned, directly or indirectly, by large U.S. shareholders.153 Of course, 
any U.S. company that managed to “thread the needle” and escape 
the clutches of section 7874(b) would have to beware of falling within 
the ambit of a foreign analogue to subpart F; the choice of residence 
country may be dictated by the need to avoid becoming subject to 
such a taxing regime. However, if both the foreign parent company 
 
statement to the sum of the member’s interest income and the proportion of the group’s 
worldwide net interest expense equal to the member’s proportion of the group’s 
worldwide  earnings). 
 151. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of Alternative 
Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 TAX L. REV. 353, 357 
(2001) (explaining how taxpayers can avoid the impact of proportionality limitations on interest 
deductions with debt-financed portfolio income and lease/own decisions). 
 152. See id. at 385 (explaining difficulty of coping with portfolio income). 
 153. Subpart F operates by constructively distributing income to U.S. shareholders. I.R.C. 
§ 951(a)(1) (2012). 
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and the creditor entity are residents of a low-tax country such as 
Ireland, such arrangements would remain tax-advantaged. And as 
long as earnings stripping transactions remain tax-advantaged, 
inversion transactions remain attractive. Finally, none of these 
proposals reduce the incentive for U.S. companies to rely on debt 
provided by unrelated foreign providers. 
Indeed, the only reform that would eliminate the tax advantages 
of strategic incorporation and borrowing would be the reinstatement 
of a significant withholding tax on interest, both as a matter of treaty 
and statutory law. But doing so would be complex. Not only would 
our treaty partners have to consent to such a change, but doing it 
“right” would be technically difficult. Taxes on gross income can easily 
become confiscatory. Consider the effects of such a tax on a foreign 
creditor who obtained the funds underlying the loan from another, or 
incurred other related expenses. To avoid imposing multiple levels of 
tax on the same income, treaties would have to include provisions 
mandating the flow-through of tax credits for taxes paid at source to 
those upstream lenders.154 If pass-through credits are provided, this 
change in treaty policy may be more palatable to taxpayers than it 
would have been even a few years ago due to the advent of FATCA 
and the CRS,155 both of which are aimed at ensuring the ultimate 
beneficiaries of investment income report such income to their 
countries of residence. Indeed, to the extent individual taxpayers are 
forced to report such income to their home tax authorities, the taxes 
paid by foreign corporations (as well as foreign individuals) at source 
may end up costing the treasury of the treaty partner rather than the 
foreign investor.156 
No taxing regime is perfect, and even a perfectly creditable source 
tax carries with it a danger arising from the disparities in national tax 
 
 154. The same problem is encountered with dividend income. As the intermediary entities 
in that context tend to be part of the same corporate family, though, it seems natural to either 
credit foreign taxes to, or exempt the dividend income received from the income of, subsequent 
recipients. Indeed, unrelated recipients of dividends often are subject to a second level of income 
tax. Many loan transactions are the result of a string of loan transactions involving unrelated 
parties (for example, a depositor to a bank to a hedge fund to an operating business); if credits 
(or exemptions) do not flow from one unrelated creditor to the next, any given amount of 
interest may be subject to multiple levels of tax. 
 155. See supra note 131. 
 156. Even a perfect pass-through credit will not compensate investors for the loss of their 
ability to defer taxation while the income is retained at the corporate level. It will merely reduce 
the sting of the individual-level tax which all too many taxpayers evaded prior to enactment of 
those new regimes. Under present economic conditions, this time value of money loss may not 
be very significant. 
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rates. No country, at least not purposely, grants credit for taxes paid 
to a foreign country in an amount greater than the taxes that would 
have been payable on such income had it been earned domestically. 
Thus, if the U.S. source tax rate exceeds the tax rate in the ultimate 
creditor’s state of residence, the burden of this excess will fall on the 
foreign creditor rather than its residence country’s treasury. This 
would likely cause such creditors to increase the required amount of 
pretax return—the interest rate—demanded of U.S. debtors to levels 
above that demanded of debtors from countries levying source tax at 
a lower rate. Such an increase in the cost of capital might be enough 
to convince some businesses to relocate abroad, or to avoid making 
new investments in the United States. It was fear of precisely this effect 
that led many to argue that the United States should not tax such 
interest income in the 1980s.157 Source countries, as well as residence 
countries, engage in tax competition in an effort to attract investors. 
Even if not worried about this under present economic conditions, 
terms embodied in tax treaties are hard to change.158 
Interest payments are not the only device used by MNEs to strip 
income out of high-tax jurisdictions such as the United States. 
Royalties and license fees are another. Presumably, as the opportunities 
for interest-based earnings stripping transactions are reduced, more 
foreign—and domestic—MNEs will turn to royalties or license-based 
schemes.159 As Starbucks has shown,160 virtually any business can use 
such schemes to covert ordinary business income into stateless 
income. However, as discussed in the next Section, closing down such 
opportunities may be even harder than closing down the opportunities 
for interest-based earnings stripping transactions. 
 
 157. See supra note 129. 
 158. But see Sullivan, supra note 107, at 260 (arguing that allowing earnings stripping is 
an irrational way to attract foreign investment). 
 159. At present, these schemes seem to be used mostly by U.S. MNEs to strip income from 
high-tax European countries into tax-haven countries. Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 714. 
Subpart F generally does not pick up this income because of its exception for royalty income 
paid by unrelated parties in the course of the active conduct of a trade or business or by operation 
of section 954(c)(6) “which characterizes intragroup royalties and other deductible 
payments . . . as active income as long as the amounts are not paid out of the payer’s own subpart 
F income.” See Kleinbard, supra note 86, at 1524 (describing Starbuck’s tax planning). 
 160. See Kleinbard, supra note 86, at 1516 (“[I]f Starbucks can organize itself as a 
successful stateless income generator, any multinational company can.”). 
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B. Taxation of Royalties and Other Payments for Intellectual Property 
Transactions for stripping income out of a jurisdiction through the 
payment of royalties or other analogous transfers are often161 
mechanically similar to those of interest stripping transactions. Instead 
of cash, the foreign tax-haven entity leases its rights to use some form 
of intellectual property rights to the operating U.S. business. The U.S. 
business deducts the royalties paid for the use of that property as an 
expense of its U.S. operations. Although by statute such royalty 
payments are considered U.S. source income162 subject to a 
withholding tax,163 in practice, most treaties waive most or all of this 
source tax.164 Thus, the judicious choice of a residence country enables 
taxpayers receiving such payments to avoid or reduce both source and 
residence country tax paid on such income. Finding such an amenable 
country has become easier, as an increasing number of countries have 
adopted “patent box” regimes, which provide low tax rates for income 
derived from intellectual property rights developed within 
their borders.165 
Devising a regime for taxing intellectual property income at 
source, however, presents an even greater challenge than devising a 
regime for the taxation of interest income. Optics is the first problem. 
The distinction between “business profits” and “passive royalties” 
simply has not been challenged to the same degree as the distinction 
between debt and equity. The intellectual confusion between debt and 
 
 161. The mechanics vary, and are distinctly more complex, when they involve “cost-sharing 
arrangements.” See Bret Wells, Revisiting Section 367(d): How Treasury Took the Bite Out of 
Section 367(d) and What Should Be Done About It, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 519, 555–64 (2014) 
(discussing mechanics of such arrangements). 
 162. I.R.C. § 861(a)(4) (2012) (U.S. source income includes “[r]entals or royalties from 
property located in the United States or from any interest in such property, including rentals or 
royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States patents, copyrights, secret 
processes and formulas, good will, trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other 
like property.”). 
 163. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1); Internal Revenue, 26 C.F.R. § 1.871-7(b)(1). 
 164. See I.R.S. Table 1, supra note 81 (columns 10 & 11, listing withholding rates under 
treaties). The same treaty provisions provide concessionary rates for lease payments made with 
respect to the use in the United States of tangible personal property owned by a resident of the 
treaty partner. See id.; Wells, supra note 22, at 8 (describing “Lease Stripping Transactions”). 
 165. The EC recently determined that these regimes would not be considered to constitute 
either “state aid” or “harmful tax competition” as long as they require “substantial” economic 
activity in the jurisdiction. See DLA PIPER, supra note 21 (noting countries in Europe with such 
regimes include the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, France, 
and Hungary). 
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equity166 makes it easy to contend that the economic returns from each 
ought to be treated identically.167 Because “business income” is taxed 
at source, so too should be the returns from “debt”—and because 
income from “equity” is currently subjected to two levels of taxation, 
so too should be income from “debt.”168 The same could be said of 
income derived from the use of intellectual property. Ultimately most 
of this income, too, is derived from active business operations, with 
the remainder the monopoly profits generated by legal protections 
conferred on the property in the market state. Yet returns labeled 
“royalties” have not been conceptualized as merely another 
distribution of business income equivalent to dividends. 
This may be because intellectual property income so clearly has 
more than one source—the country of development and the country 
of use—each of which deserves the right to levy the primary tax on a 
portion of the total taxable return.169 This makes the prospect of 
assigning not single but double taxing rights to just one of those 
countries a very unattractive proposition. Indeed, determining the 
proper (economically accurate) allocation of income for even the first 
level of taxation between these sources is not simple,170 and may differ 
 
 166. See supra note 97. 
 167. Scholars differ on whether such income should be taxed once (at the business level) 
or twice (at the business level and again at the shareholder level). See Wells, supra note 22, at 
text accompanying notes 5–9 (describing integration proposals). 
 168. Note that this position does not require subscribing to the view, as some have argued, 
see Fleming et al., supra note 34, at 695–96, that related party financing is “costless” to a business 
enterprise. That proposition seems implausible on its face. The entity providing cash or credit to 
another entity in the very least incurs an opportunity cost (i.e., it gives up the opportunity to 
use the money in other income-producing activities) and may be incurring actual, actual out-of-
pocket costs to obtain use of that money. The question is where the return from that investment 
ought to be taxed—and under tax treaties, that question is usually determined by whether the 
recipient is itself engaged in a U.S. trade or business rather than by whether the income was 
derived from U.S. business activities. 
 169. As discussed in more detail infra Section III.C, the problem is similar to that faced 
when dealing with income arising from the sale of goods manufactured by a taxpayer in one 
country and sold in another, or services performed in one country and sold to customers in 
another. See REUVEN AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 44–45 (2007); Lawrence Lokken, The Sources of Income 
from International Uses and Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 TAX L. REV. 233, 241–42 
(1981). Note that one could make the same argument with respect to debt and equity, in that 
the accumulations of capital used to provide such funds take place in one country, and are used 
in another, with each country deserving the right to tax part of the return, but the analogy has 
not found much purchase in that context. 
 170. Although some advocate the use of the “profit split” method for making this 
allocation, see Internal Revenue, 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-6 (detailing profit split method); Wells & 
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not only from taxpayer to taxpayer but also from project to project. 
Some have concluded that the problem is too difficult to manage, and 
thus that all the income should be assigned to one state.171 
In addition, the expenses associated with the derivation of 
royalties—research and development expenses, most obviously—make 
it an unattractive subject for a gross income-based withholding tax or 
its economic analogue, a statutory disallowance of a deduction for 
royalties. However, the failure to impose any sort of tax on such 
income in the market state, the treatment accorded by most treaties,172 
has led to systematic undertaxation of such income as the ownership 
of intellectual property—and the associated taxing rights—has 
become concentrated in low-tax countries.173 
 
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 26, at 595 (OECD accepts profit split methodology), the 
method actually highlights rather than solves the problem of determining how much of the 
overall profit should be allocated between countries. There is no reason to believe that the 
appropriate profit split should be the same for all taxpayers or even all products; thus, the 
application of this method needs to be either highly contextual and fact dependent or to rely on 
arbitrary formulas. See JULIE ROIN, TRANSFER PRICING IN THE COURTS: A CROSS-COUNTRY 
COMPARISON, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 185, 191 (Wolfgang Schon and Kai A. Konrad eds., 2012) (“Under the profit split 
method each affiliated entity is assigned the proper return for its ‘routine’ contributions first, 
with the remaining (‘residual’) profit allocated to the entity performing a [sic] nonroutine 
functions or contributing nonroutine property . . . . Like the transactional profit split method, 
the US profit split method . . . is less successful when more than one entity makes such 
[nonroutine] contributions because, by definition, no market comparable exists to help the fact-
finder allocate the residual profit between such entities.”). 
 171. See Lokken, supra note 169, at 242 (“[A] typical royalty cannot feasibly be split 
between the place of the licensee’s use of the licensed property and the place of the activities by 
which the licensor created the property.”). Professor Lokken argued for the taxation of such 
income in the market state, regarding that state as having the strongest claim. See id. at 243. 
Interestingly, current treaty practice—combined with the development of patent box regimes—
would do the opposite by assigning all income to a development country, which often levies a 
tax at a risible rate. 
 172. See I.R.S. Table 1, supra note 81 (listing withholding rates). 
 173. See OECD, supra note 107, at 15–16 (“The separation of taxable profits from the 
location of the value creating activity is particularly clear with respect to intangible assets, and the 
phenomenon has grown rapidly. For example, the ratio of the value of royalties received to 
spending on research and development in a group of low-tax countries was six times higher than 
the average ratio for all other countries, and has increased three-fold between 2009 and 2012.”); 
Matthias Dischinger & Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxes and the Location of Intangible Assets 
Within Multinational Firms 3 (Munich Economics Discussion Paper No. 2008-15), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.606.2157&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(finding “evidence for a statistically significant and quantitatively relevant bias of intangible 
property holdings towards affiliates with a low corporate tax rate relative to other group 
locations”). As patent boxes become more widespread, taxpayers will have a wider choice of low-
tax locations in which to park their intangible assets. See supra note 21 (describing patent boxes). 
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And again, even more extreme undertaxation is possible when the 
owner and the user of the intellectual property are related entities. A 
related party is happy to overstate the value of intellectual property 
(thus overstating its own income for tax purposes) if the overstatement 
results in an understatement of the income derived by a (higher-taxed) 
related entity. The question is what to do about this in a world in 
which it is very difficult, or even impossible, to determine the 
appropriate price for transferring intellectual property.174 Having 
succeeded in characterizing the disallowance of deductions for 
“excessive” interest deductions as a legitimate response to transfer 
pricing violations, a statute disallowing royalty deductions for 
payments to related parties in excess of a stated percentage of EBITDA 
might well pass treaty muster. 
But what would be the appropriate percentage or formula for 
imposing such a disallowance? Indeed, is EBITDA even the right 
baseline? If the concern is that taxpayers are understating the amount 
of income due to U.S. sales activities, it might be better to require that 
those U.S. activities generate an appropriate return—say, impute a 
return equal to a stated percentage of the U.S. operating unit’s 
expenditures—and work backwards from there. In short, instead of 
looking like section 163(j), which limits the percentage of the overall 
profit that can be reduced by the related party payment, perhaps the 
statutory rule should disallow royalty deductions that reduce the U.S. 
sales entity’s income to below an expected return on investment or 
return on expenditure. Such a statute would be equivalent to 
mandating a uniform, one-sided transfer pricing adjustment on royalty 
transactions, with all the administrative difficulties and uncertainties 
such analyses entail.175 Further, and this is a big further, such a one-
sided analysis would not allocate any portion of the returns from the 
legal protections provided by the United States to the United States 
for tax purposes. The only one-sided analysis that would make such an 
allocation would be one that disallowed royalties in excess of the 
amount necessary to generate a stated return on the foreign payee’s 
 
 174. The difficulty is both substantive (such property is extremely difficult to value) and 
administrative (tax authorities do not have the resources to closely examine each 
such  transaction). 
 175. Of course, if both entities contributed intellectual property or other extraordinary 
factors to the income producing process, a two-sided transfer pricing analysis would be required. 
This exercise would replicate the profit-split method of pricing transactions. 
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research and development and other related business expenses.176 The 
problem, of course, is that the taxing authorities in the United States 
generally do not have access to such information about a 
foreign  taxpayer. 
They may be able to obtain that information, though, if the 
foreign taxpayer is related to the U.S. payor. The United States could, 
conceivably, limit the U.S. payor’s deduction for royalties to an 
amount equal to a related foreign payee’s related research and 
development expenses (or those expenses plus a stated return). This 
would leave the U.S. tax authorities in the position of having to audit 
expenditures that were largely taken abroad, which may be difficult, 
and obvious avoidance possibilities would have to be foreclosed. For 
example, the impact of the deduction limitation would be blunted, if 
not eliminated, if that foreign payee were allowed to claim as an 
expense the costs of purchasing royalty rights from another foreign 
related party, as the price charged by that related party could include 
the value of the monopoly conferred by U.S. legal authorities. One 
possibility would be to limit the expenses taken into account to 
amounts paid to unrelated parties, although one might want to 
supplement such a limitation with a rule allowing related entities to 
effectively combine for purposes of determining the total amount of 
third party royalty-related expenditures. If Treasury is willing to 
consolidate related foreign entities for purposes of computing the 
allowable amount of interest deductions, there would seem to be no 
impediment to doing the same for research and 
development expenses. 
But what if the foreign payee is unrelated to the U.S. payor? 
Consolidation imposed through a limitation of deductions would be 
unavailable. Although the problem of “excessive” royalty deductions 
does not arise between unrelated payees and payors, failing to levy a 
U.S. tax on the returns generated by the intellectual property 
protections provided by U.S. law would encourage U.S. intellectual 
property rights to be held by unrelated foreign entities just as the non-
taxation of interest payments to unrelated foreign creditors 
encourages domestic entities to borrow from unrelated foreign 
creditors. The underlying problem—that treaty provisions grant the 
right to tax U.S. source income to residence countries that may not 
exercise that right—would remain, and with it the incentives for 
 
 176. This technique could be flipped, of course, if the U.S. entity engaged in research and 
development or production activities and marketed its products abroad. 
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taxpayers to take actions that will substantially reduce U.S. tax 
revenues. There is, after all, very little prospect that such treaty 
concessions would result in anything close to an equal exchange of 
revenues between the United States and a low-tax treaty partner. No 
Irish taxpayer is going to structure its business transactions to generate 
a large royalty payable to a U.S. entity. It makes financial sense for 
intangible assets to reside in low-tax countries, and the United States 
is not a low-tax country. 
The only legal change that would remove the incentive to park 
ownership of intellectual (or indeed other types of personal property) 
used in the United States in unrelated entities resident in low-tax 
jurisdictions would be to reinstate the right to tax royalty and other 
property income at source. And, as in the interest context, the only 
way to accomplish that is through the explicit imposition of a 
withholding tax. In short, reformation of treaties would be necessary. 
However, even if the treaty partners were amendable to such a change, 
devising an acceptable withholding tax regime would be far from 
simple.177 The imposition of a gross basis withholding tax at the thirty 
percent statutory rate would run into the same problems—and the 
same objections—as a flat disallowance of royalty deductions. As a 
practical matter, there is no way to impose the “right” amount of tax 
using such a gross income-based taxing mechanism. However, those 
very imperfections may provide a mechanism for enticing (or forcing) 
taxpayers to opt into a net income-based source tax regime.   
A withholding tax regime would need to allow for the division of 
taxing rights between the country in which the research and 
development activities took place and the country whose legal system 
provided the income-boosting monopoly powers. One might want to 
analogize this situation to the one encountered by taxpayers that both 
produce and sell inventory property. Regulations allow taxpayers to 
divide income generated by such “mixed” activities between their sales 
and manufacturing components on a fifty-fifty basis;178 a similarly 
arbitrary division might be imposed in this context and effectuated by 
imposing a withholding tax equal to a fraction of the statutory tax rate. 
However, such a division, in addition to being arbitrary, runs the 
risk of being confiscatory if levied on the taxpayer’s gross rather than 
 
 177. See Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 26, at 569–70 (describing efforts of 
a UN Ad Hoc Group of Experts in 1969 to devise an appropriate taxing regime). 
 178. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3 (as amended in 2006) (rules for the allocation and 
apportionment of mixed source sales income). 
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net income. After all, royalty income is often, if not always, associated 
with substantial expenses (including research and development 
expenses). If one of the parties to the transaction incurs the lion’s 
share of the joint expenses, even a pro-rated (i.e., arbitrarily reduced) 
withholding tax rate may leave that party paying withholding tax at an 
extraordinarily high effective rate. The excessive tax is unlikely to be 
ameliorated through even a well-designed pass-through credit 
provided by the payee’s country of residence because (unlike in the 
interest context), many of the expenses would not be royalties, nor 
even U.S. sourced, in the hands of the recipients, making a full pass-
through extraordinarily difficult. 
The very unattractiveness of such a tax regime, though, might be 
its salvation, in that it could make an alternate approach attractive to 
both taxpayers and source countries. This alternate approach is already 
in use in another context, rental real estate. Both the Internal Revenue 
Code179 and treaties180 allow nonbusiness foreign taxpayers receiving 
income from the rental of real estate to “elect” into business status for 
purposes of determining the tax liability of this income. This allows 
them the option of being taxed on their net rental income at regular 
statutory rates, rather than gross rental income at treaty rates. Similar 
provision could be made for foreign taxpayers receiving U.S. source 
royalty income that is taxed at source. This would allow such taxpayers 
to deduct their costs of developing such intellectual property prior to 
computing their source tax liability.181 Such a rule could incorporate a 
division of taxing authority between the market country and the 
development countries by grossing up the allowable deductions by an 
appropriate profit percentage before applying the U.S. tax to the 
remainder, thus dealing with the first complication as well.182 
Unfortunately, current tax treaty policy seems to be moving in the 
direction of less, rather than more, taxation of royalty income earned 
 
 179. See I.R.C. §§ 871(d) (individuals); 882(d) (corporations). 
 180. See 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 6.5. 
 181. This would unfortunately leave the United States’ tax authorities in the position of 
having to audit expenditures which were largely undertaken abroad. And it would be a 
complicated audit, as it would involve allocating the overall research and development costs 
between U.S. and foreign components (as the same research and development may lead to the 
creation of intellectual property rights in multiple jurisdictions). 
 182. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in setting such a percentage, see Fleming 
et al., supra note 34, at 712–13. In addition, such a taxing regime might be undermined through 
the use of an intermediate entity which purchases the intellectual property from its developer at 
a price incorporating (at least) the value of the legal protections afforded by the market state. 
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from foreign sources. In an effort to attract research and development 
activities, several European countries have enacted “patent boxes” 
which provide preferential tax treatment of royalty income derived 
from the exploitation of intellectual property.183 The European 
Commission concluded that these tax regimes would not constitute 
proscribed “state aid” provided the taxpayers covered by them were 
required to engage in “substantial” in-country research and 
development activities.184 The effect of these regimes, of course, is to 
attract research and development activities by turning the associated 
royalty income into a variant of “stateless” income, subject to tax 
neither at source (because of the treaty reductions in source taxation) 
nor (very much) in the country of residence. Many have advocated for 
the United States’ adoption of such a regime to counter this 
competition for the research and development activities.185 Doing so 
would be to participate in a classic race-to-the-bottom framework. If 
non-adopting countries like the United States adopt patent box 
regimes, MNEs would benefit by paying lower taxes wherever they 
operate, all of the affected countries would collect less revenue, and 
research and development activities would take place in whichever 
country they would have been in had no patent box regimes existed. 
Indeed, even if unwilling to reinstate the source tax on all royalties 
or impose a deduction limitation on related party royalty payments 
generally, the United States should do so for taxpayers from countries 
with patent box regimes. Subjecting royalty income to tax at source 
would reduce the benefit of the patent box tax regime,186 and with it 
the incentive to remove research and development activities to the 
 
 183. Merrill et al., supra note 85. 
 184. See supra note 21. 
 185. See, e.g., Bernard Knight & Goud Maragani, It Is Time for the United States to 
Implement a Patent Box Tax Regime to Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 39, 41 (2013) (advocating adoption); Merrill et al., supra note 85 (same); Evan M. 
Migdail & Bruce Thompson, Patent box concept emerges on the tax reform agenda for US Congress, 
DLA PIPER PUBS. (June 10, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/
publications/2015/05/patent-box-concept-emerges-us-tax-reform/ (detailing legislative 
efforts); Robert W. Wood, Patent Boxes come to Ireland & UK, Why not U.S.?, FORBES (Oct. 16, 
2014, 1:57 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/10/16/patent-boxes-come-to-
ireland-uk-why-not-u-s/2/#475c0646552c (advocating adoption). 
 186. Imposing a tax at the full statutory rate on the entire royalty payment, even that 
portion attributable to the return on the research and development activities, would be required 
to completely eliminate the benefit of a patent box regime. However, that would probably be 
regarded as overreaching, as countries generally have the right to determine the rate of tax to be 
levied on income generated within their borders. 
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sponsoring nation (as well as to engage in an inversion transaction to 
become eligible to take advantage of the regime). And indeed, in the 
2016 U.S. Model Treaty, taxpayers are supposed to be denied benefits 
for income that will be taxed under “special tax regimes” in the treaty 
partner.187 Unfortunately, and to my mind inexplicably, the terms of 
the Model Treaty specifically exclude from the definition of a “special 
tax regime” a royalty regime which “condition[s] such benefits on the 
extent of research and development activities that take place in the 
Contracting State.”188 In short, the Treasury Department seems to 
have decided that it is perfectly appropriate for the U.S. fisc to finance, 
by foregoing its legitimate tax claims,189 the United Kingdom’s 
attempt (for example) to lure research and development activities from 
the United States to the United Kingdom. 
The only excuse for such self-defeating behavior is that, in the end, 
it may be impossible to effectively impose a source tax on royalties. 
After all, it is not just related parties who are willing to buy intellectual 
property rights from a foreign owner at a price incorporating the value 
of U.S. legal protection. If a foreign entity A, the original owner of 
such rights, sells them to an unrelated foreign entity B, which then 
licenses them to a (related or unrelated) U.S. operating entity C, the 
income subject to any net income-based U.S. source tax (whether 
imposed on C through a deduction disallowance or on B through a 
withholding tax) could well be minimal because the taxable income 
amount would be reduced by the payment to A (if not B, if C and B 
are unrelated entities). Transferable credits, available in the interest 
context, do not work well in this one because the associated expenses 
are of many different types. Moreover, to the extent those expenses 
relate to research or development activities carried out by A or B 
outside the United States, the countries in which those activities took 
place would be well within their rights in refusing to pass through the 
 
 187. See 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 12.2(a). 
 188. See id. at art. 3.1.l.ii. 
 189. It is perfectly appropriate for the United States to give up its claim to tax the return 
from any research and development activities that have moved abroad. One could describe the 
analytic basis of our current international tax regime (as well as territorial tax regimes) as 
following the principle that the tax base follows the economic base: there is no U.S. tax if there 
are no U.S. economic activities. After all, activities occurring outside the United States generally 
do not impose significant costs on the U.S. government. In the patent box context, though, the 
taxpayer removes only part of its U.S. economic activities, leaving behind a part that requires 
the (sometimes expensive) protection of the U.S. government. There is no reason that 
protection should be provided for “free.” 
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credit to offset the tax liability due on income attributable to activities 
occurring within their jurisdiction.190 
Nor is this the end of the parade of horribles. There is yet another 
method for avoiding a source tax on royalties, one which poses 
perhaps an even greater threat to the U.S. economy than the schemes 
described earlier. Instead of licensing intellectual property for use in 
the United States, businesses may switch to selling finished products 
into the U.S. market at prices incorporating the value of the 
intellectual property inherent in those products. If businesses do this, 
not only will the United States collect no additional tax revenue, but 
more of its economic base will disappear—all the U.S. business 
activities and jobs involved in transforming the intellectual property 
into the final product. At least it will if the businesses at issue are 
foreign entities, since in many, if not most, cases, sales by foreign 
companies can be structured so that they do not give rise to U.S. 
source income. This last possibility, and the possible countermeasures, 
are the focus of the next Section. 
 
 190. One of the “old chestnuts” of U.S. tax jurisprudence, Karrer v. United States, 152 F. 
Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1957), involves a similar factual situation. The taxpayer in that case, a Swiss 
professor, was employed by a Swiss corporation to work on a joint research project. Under the 
terms of their agreement, the company owned the commercial rights, including patents, 
resulting from the research while the professor was to be paid a percentage of the net proceeds 
from the sale of products developed with the use of those patents. The Swiss company licensed 
its U.S. intellectual property rights to its U.S. affiliate. The US. affiliate paid the Swiss parent a 
royalty for the use of this property. The U.S. affiliate also paid Karrer the sums due him under 
his contract with the Swiss parent with respect to the U.S. sales. For reasons known only to the 
Internal Revenue Service, instead of contending that the payments to Karrer constituted 
additional royalties paid to the Swiss parent (royalties that would have been taxable as apparently 
no tax treaty applied), it argued that the payments constituted royalties in Karrer’s hands—a 
difficult case to make given that Karrer did not own the underlying patent. The court held that 
these payments were recompense for personal services performed by Karrer outside the United 
States, and thus fell outside U.S. taxing jurisdiction. That may have been the right result in that 
the U.S. withholding tax ended up being collected only on the Swiss company’s net—rather 
than gross—royalties, see supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (advocating a net income-based 
tax), but perhaps it was not. It depends on one’s view of the proper characterization of personal 
services income that is measured by the value of patent rights. In the absence of U.S. 
enforcement of those patent rights, presumably, the price of the products sold by the U.S. 
affiliate, and thus Karrer’s checks, would have been lower. Thus Karrer benefited not just from 
performing services, but also from monopoly rights conferred by the U.S. government—an 
increment of value that perhaps should have been traced to (and taxed by) its U.S. source. 
Indeed, one could view Karrer’s non-taxation as exemplifying the difficulties posed by earnings 
stripping transactions effected between unrelated parties. 
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C. Sales Income 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the U.S. tax base comes from sales 
of foreign products (both goods and services) into the United States. 
In today’s economy, many of the highest value products take the form 
of services or digital content. Though some services have to be 
provided locally, an ever-increasing number can be performed 
remotely; likewise, sellers of digital content never have to set foot in 
the United States. Even physical products can be ordered and shipped 
from remote sellers, over the Internet. Though legal changes could 
draw some of these sales into the U.S. tax net when they are effected 
by foreign companies, it is hard to envision how such taxes could be 
enforceable. How can the U.S. tax authorities reach business entities 
with no physical connections to the United States? But the 
enforcement troubles are not limited to remote seller contexts. They 
exist even when a foreign entity sells products or services to a domestic 
entity for resale to U.S. customers. 
Legislators191 and Treasury192 have long worried about the use of 
non-arm’s-length pricing in transactions between related parties to 
 
 191. Congress first authorized the consolidation of “the accounts of . . . related trades and 
businesses . . . for the purpose of making an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, 
profits, income, deductions, or capital” in the Revenue Act of 1921. Robert N. Lent, Comment, 
New Importance for Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 346 
(1966). By 1928, Congress had authorized the Commissioner of the IRS to “allocate gross 
income or deductions among businesses controlled by the same interests to prevent the evasion of 
taxes or to clearly reflect income.” Id. at 346. The language changed somewhat over the next 
several tax acts, but by 1939, Congress settled on the language that is currently found in the first 
sentence of what is now section 482 of the Code. See id. (“the law has remained consistent 
through the 1939 Code to the present Section 482 of the 1954 Code”). Congress added a 
second sentence to section 482 in 1986, allowing Treasury to adjust the price at which intangible 
property is transferred among related parties so that it is “commensurate with the income” to 
“fulfill the objective that the division of income between related parties reasonably reflect the 
relative economic activity undertaken by each.” See also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH 
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 1015 (Comm. Print 1987). 
And most people regard the enactment of the subpart F regime in 1962 as an attempt to 
backstop the general inadequacies in the operation of the section 482 transfer pricing rules. See 
generally Federal Tax System—Message from the President of the United States, 107 Cong. Rec. 
6456, 6458 (1961) (proposing enactment of subpart F regime to eliminate the “shelter for tax 
escape . . . aided by artificial arrangements between parent and subsidiary regarding 
intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights”). 
 192. See Michael C. Durst & Robert Culbertson, Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective 
Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57 TAX L. REV. 37, 42–76 
(2003) (detailing successive attempts to promulgate regulations under section 482 of the Code 
to forestall transfer pricing abuses). 
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reduce taxable business income. Although section 482 and parts of 
the subpart F regime were supposed to ameliorate such abuses, no one 
believes that they are very effective. Far too few related party sales have 
third party comparators to make the arm’s-length standard very 
useful. One reason such comparators are missing is that many of the 
transfers involve items that incorporate hard-to-value intellectual 
property; the value of the property then, to a very large extent, equates 
to the value of the intellectual property. When that intellectual 
property is owned by the foreign seller or another foreign party, under 
current law there is little reason for the country in which the buyer is 
located to try to differentiate the (nontaxable) royalty portion from 
its generic accompaniment. Thus, for example, Starbucks can justify 
charging much more for coffee beans that have been roasted to its 
specification than for unroasted beans, even though the roasting 
process itself is not expensive.193 
In a world in which royalties are taxed at source, it may be possible 
to “kill two birds with one stone” by forcing all transfers of branded 
or otherwise intellectual property-protected property to be bifurcated, 
into an intellectual property component and a “generic” component, 
with the sums paid for the first component treated as royalties for tax 
purposes.194 Taxpayers have long taken advantage of the opportunities 
to slice, dice, and consolidate income to achieve the most desirable 
(from a tax standpoint) characterization; forcing bifurcation in these 
instances would take away some of this advantage. Although this 
places a significant burden on the withholding agent, which must 
figure out how much of the payment constitutes the hidden royalty,195 
when the withholding agent is related to the seller, the burden should 
be tolerable.196 Related parties, after all, are already responsible for 
documenting the derivation of their inter-corporate pricing; it would 
not be too much to ask that they document the portion of that price 
that is attributable to the intellectual property component of the items 
transferred. At worst, one could once again make recourse to a 
 
 193. See Kleinbard, supra note 86, at 1526–28 (describing Starbucks’s internal 
coffee pricing). 
 194. This only makes sense, of course, if the tax regime for royalty payments is changed, 
so that such payments are either subject to a source-based withholding tax or 
made nondeductible. 
 195. This can be both a burden and an opportunity, of course; if the national tax authorities 
have difficulty determining the value of the “generic” component of the transfer, the taxpayer 
may be able to understate the amount of the royalty. 
 196. Indeed, the larger problem is likely the administrative one facing tax authorities, who 
would be in charge of policing the bona fides of such bifurcations. 
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formulary approach, artificially assigning some portion of the total 
price (or income) to the intellectual property component, at least as a 
presumption. Of course, this solution is premised on the adoption of 
a regime, such as the one described above, that taxes royalties 
at source. 
But what if the U.S. buyer is not related to the foreign seller? Then 
this approach seems all but unworkable. Perhaps there could be a 
default rule, similar to the FIRPTA withholding rule, mandating that 
a certain percentage of the purchase price be withheld and sent to the 
U.S. government; the foreign seller would then have the right to a 
refund of part or all of the withheld amount if it can prove to the 
satisfaction of the IRS that it exceeded the amount appropriate given 
the incorporated intellectual property rights. Choosing the default 
withholding rate, though, would be both critical and difficult. Set it 
too high, and the IRS would be overwhelmed with requests for 
readjustment; set it too low, and it may not be worth the effort 
involved in administering it. And what if there are two unrelated 
entities between the creator and the eventual seller of the products? 
CONCLUSION 
Continuing to follow a tax treaty policy that seeks removal of 
withholding tax on U.S. source “investment” income is clearly a 
mistake; all that removal does (both for businesses operating in the 
U.S. and abroad) is make it easy for those businesses to transmute 
active business income into “stateless” investment income that is 
barely, if at all, taxed. Yet walking back from this policy will be far from 
simple given the difficulties involved in renegotiating tax treaties. 
Moreover, walking backwards reveals other problems and tensions in 
the international tax rules that will be difficult, if not impossible, 
to solve. 
When U.S. business operations are carried out by domestic entities 
related to the foreign investor, a missing withholding tax can be 
approximated through the imposition of restrictions on the operating 
entities’ deductions. Indeed, such restrictions may be preferable to the 
imposition of a gross income-based withholding tax when they are 
crafted to take into account expenses incurred by a related “investor.” 
As detailed above, deduction restrictions can be structured to 
effectively consolidate the income and expenses of related entities with 
respect to particular income items, and treat it all as business income. 
So, too, can withholding taxes, but deduction limitations may have 
the advantage of not directly running afoul of treaty limitations, 
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allowing them to be adopted by congressional action and without 
bilateral negotiations. 
Such consolidation necessarily raises difficult issues. What 
percentage of an intellectual property-based return should be 
attributed to research and development activities and what percentage 
should be attributed to the legal protection provided by the country 
in which the property is used? The answer to that question is critical 
to determining the amount by which foreign research and 
development costs should be inflated for purposes of allowing a 
deduction against the operating entity’s income—or the amount by 
which the tax rate on net royalties should be reduced. How much 
income should be attributed to sales activities versus manufacturing 
activities when a multinational group manufactures goods or performs 
services in one jurisdiction, but sells them in another? To what extent 
should the rules rely on arbitrary formulas to resolve such issues, and 
to what extent individualized arms’ length determinations? Such issues 
bleed into perennial questions about source—where is intellectual 
property used, anyway? And where do sales take place? How should 
business synergies—or the lack thereof—be allocated among affected 
jurisdictions? To what extent should tax authorities rely on 
information provided by a taxpayer about the amount and relevance 
of costs incurred in other jurisdictions, and what tools are available to 
them if they choose to not so rely? None of these questions have easy 
answers, but they are no more difficult to answer—or (eventually) to 
reach agreement on with competing tax authorities—than they would 
be under either profit-split or traditional arm’s length tax regimes. 
This should not be surprising given that they are all trying to answer 
the same question: How much of the income generated by a 
functionally integrated business enterprise should be allocated to each 
of the countries within which that enterprise operates? 
The implementation problems become significantly more difficult, 
and perhaps even overwhelming, when the payor and recipient entities 
are unrelated. Business income can be stripped from U.S. operating 
entities through transactions with unrelated parties as well as related 
parties. Yet explicit (and even implicit) consolidation of operating 
income and expenses is impossible when neither entity has access to 
the other’s income and expense information. Asking taxpayers to 
“guesstimate” the portion of value attributable to the intellectual 
property component of inventory items, for example, is a recipe for 
disaster, not to mention taxpayer resentment. That leaves only gross 
basis withholding taxes (or standardized deduction disallowances) as 
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possible tools for combatting earnings stripping effected through 
transactions with unrelated parties. Those cures may be worse than 
the disease—unless the disease becomes epidemic. 
That is the ultimate question: will taxpayers rearrange their 
corporate and business structures to avoid the related party 
transactions targeted by changes in the tax rules? It is not hard to 
envision structures akin to the contract manufacturing arrangements 
constructed for purposes of avoiding the impact of the subpart F rules 
developing in the earnings stripping arena. Starbucks has both wholly 
owned stores and licensees; it is not obvious which are more 
profitable. On the other hand, for many taxpayers, implementing such 
avoidance techniques may entail financial or institutional costs, costs 
that would outweigh the tax savings to be gleaned from utilizing 
them. Certainly, the more the vertically integrated activities of MNEs 
result from business synergies rather than tax efficiencies, the more 
room countries such as the United States have to combat tax 
avoidance.197 At present, we do not know the relative importance of 
these motives for vertical integration. It may be that the targeting of 
earnings stripping transactions effected through related party 
transactions will create sound and fury, but ultimately accomplish very 
little in terms of increasing domestic tax revenues. To do nothing, 
however, would guarantee that those revenues continue to decline. 
The deficiencies in national rules for the taxation of transnational 
transactions are not solely due to lack of political will. Taxation—all 
taxation—distorts economic behavior, and choices made when 
designing a tax system necessarily reflect a polity’s decision as to which 
of the many possible economic distortions are least harmful to its fisc 
and its economy. Those choices are particularly fraught when dealing 
with transnational taxpayers and transactions because of the perceived 
(and possibly actual) mobility of the taxpayers and their activities. 
However, it does not make sense to allow transnational taxpayers to 
avoid taxes paid by fully domestic competitors through the simple 
expedient of slicing and dicing business income and expenses among 
functionally integrated but legally separate business entities. As the 
inversion “crisis” has revealed, that approach merely leads to the 
replacement of domestic companies with foreign ones, with an 
 
 197. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1312, 1396 (2001) (“If a discontinuous friction blocks a transaction, the tax law does not have 
to block it too.”); Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1674 (“[W]e should examine how the shift in the 
line affects the substitution costs and direct costs of a tax.”). 
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accompanying loss of tax revenues. It is time to try a different 
approach, and hope for the best. 
 
